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A bstract
Identifying the effects of the financial sector on economic growth and business cycles 
fluctuations has been one the main debates in economics during the last decades. 
While a lot of progress has been done, we are still far from fully understanding the 
channels linking the financial sector with the rest of the economy.
In the first chapter I focus on the relation between financial development and eco­
nomic growth. I obtain a measure of the impact of financial development on output 
from a dynamic general equilibrium model with a productive financial sector. The 
model predicts that having access to a better financial technology reduces the cost 
of credit and increases the net return of investment, generating positive and sizeable 
effects on output. The benefits from a better financial technology are maximized 
when it is used to invest in ex-ante riskier, but more profitable, investment projects.
In the following two chapters I focus on the relation between the performance of the 
financial sector and business cycle fluctuations. First, I study the impact of credit 
standards policies. The model used is able to replicate the countercyclical pattern 
of credit standards documented by the literature. The increase in the probability of 
default during expansionary periods reduces the efficiency with which investment is 
transformed into capital. In addition, the increase in the default rate reduces the 
return of savings, which in turn reduces the labor supply. Second, I study the effects 
of the financial sector to the economy through the collateral channel for the case of 
Spain. I find that loosing monetary policy autonomy is of first order importance to 
cushion risk premium shocks, while this is not the case for housing demand shocks. 
In addition, labor market rigidities provide stronger amplification effects to all type 
of shocks than financial frictions do.
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Chapter 1
The Effects of Financial 
Technology and Credit Recovery  
Efficiency on Economic Growth
Ever since Goldsmith (1969) economists have been trying to establish 
how important financial development is in fostering economic growth. 
Proving a causal link has been difficult due to endogeneity problems. I 
take a step forward by identifying the effects of exogenous changes in 
financial development and credit recovery efficiency on output using a 
dynamic general equilibrium model with a productive financial sector. 
The calibration of the model at the steady state for a panel of countries 
allows me to identify the level of financial technology and the risk-return 
investment profile for each of them. Having access to a better finan­
cial technology reduces the cost of credit and increases the net return of 
investment, generating positive and sizable effects on output. The bene­
fits from a better financial technology are maximized when it is used to 
invest in ex-ante riskier, but more profitable, investment projects.
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1.1 In trodu ction
Ever since Goldsmith (1969) economists have been trying to establish how important 
financial development is in fostering economic growth. Now, there is a well estab­
lished literature showing a positive relation between them. The seminal papers of 
King and Levine (1993a) and (1993b) were the first to document a positive asso­
ciation between different measures of financial development and economic growth. 
This raised a fundamental question: was the higher level of financial development 
the result of a higher level of economic development? Or did instead the former lead 
to the later?.
Proving a causal relationship has resisted decades of research. The main difficulty 
has been in identifying the growth of output that is caused by exogenous changes 
in financial development. Three different approaches have been taken to overcome 
this problem. One approach uses instrumental variables that are correlated with 
cross-country differences in financial development, but which are uncorrelated with 
economic growth beyond their link with financial development and other growth 
determinants (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998), Levine (1998) 
and Levine Loayza and Beck (2000)). A second approach relies on industry-level and 
firm-level data across a broad cross-section of countries (Rajan and Zingales (1998), 
Fisman and Love (2003) and Bena and Jurajda (2007)). They find that the effects of 
financial development are especially pronounced on those industries that rely more 
on external finance. Finally, there is a large literature analysing how changes in 
financial regulation have affected regional growth (Jayaratne and Strahan (1996), 
Guiso, Sapienza and Zingales (2002) and Bertrand, Schoar and Thesmar (2007)).1
The literature mentioned above makes the rejection of a causal effect of financial 
development on economic growth very difficult. However, we still lack a reliable 
quantitative measure of the contribution of financial development to output, and 
the transmission mechanisms through which it ends up enhancing economic growth
xSee Levine (2005) for a more extended discussion of the theoretical and empirical literature.
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are far from being understood. As Levine (2004, p. 86) says:
"To the extent that financial systems exert a first-order impact on 
economic growth, we need a fuller understanding of what determines fi­
nancial development ... much more work is required to better understand 
the role of financial factors in the process of economic growth. "
The aim of this paper is to take a step forward in understanding the mechanics 
of financial development and to obtain a quantitative measure of the effects on 
output. To do so, I develop a general equilibrium model with two sectors: a sector 
that produces consumption goods and a productive financial sector. Firms on the 
former sector combine labor and capital to produce consumption goods. To increase 
the stock of capital, which depreciates over time, firms obtain funding from financial 
intermediaries and invest in risky investment opportunities. Financial intermediaries 
base the loan approval decision on an estimate of the probability of default of each 
investment project. The production structure of the financial sector is similar to 
that of Hauswald and Marquez (2003) and Ruckes (2004), in which the default 
rate depends on the resources that banks spend generating information about the 
quality of each investment project to be financed, the financial technology and, of 
course, the risk of the investment project. From a general equilibrium point of 
view, the conceptual modeling strategy of the financial sector is similar to Boyd and 
Prescott (1986), Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), and Greenwood, Sanchez and 
Wang (2007): financial intermediaries affect economic growth to the extent that 
their performance modifies the efficiency with which the resources are allocated. 
By improving information on firms, financial intermediaries can accelerate economic 
growth.
Then, the model is calibrated at the steady state for a panel of countries. The 
modeling of the financial industry as a productive sector allows to calibrate the 
deep variables of the financial sector of each country. More precisely, the values of
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the risk return investment profile and the financial technology are chosen such that 
the cost of credit and the default rate are equal to the historical average value for 
each country.
To asses the goodness of the calibration of the model I first construct a cross coun­
try data set and study the relation of output with the credit to output ratio, the 
traditional measure of financial development, and different variables that can, po­
tentially, uncover the mechanics of financial development: the default rate, the cost 
of credit and the credit recovery efficiency. Following Levine (1993), this is done 
using a cross-country panel data-set and comparing the cross-country time series 
averages. As expected, there is a positive and strong relationship between the credit 
to output ratio and output. The rest of the variables also exhibit a clear pattern: in 
richer countries credit is cheaper, the default rate is lower and the credit recovery 
efficiency is higher. The cross-correlations generated by the calibrated model turn 
out to be very similar to those obtained from the real data. They also provide inter­
esting insights when analyzing the calibrated risk-return investment profile and the 
financial technology. Richer countries invest in more risky projects, but that deliver 
higher returns if they succeed. Richer countries are also associated with a better 
financial technology.
To understand the importance the model assigns to each factor for economic growth, 
I analyse how the calibrated output, consumption and investment change when the 
financial technology, the credit recovery efficiency and the risk-return investment 
profile are changed exogenously for each country. When the financial technology of 
all countries is exogenously changed for the value of the most financially developed 
country, the cross-country average increase of output is 0.7%, while consumption and 
investment increase 0.5% and 1.5% respectively. When, in addition to changing the 
financial technology, the risk-return is also exogenously changed to the values of the 
most financially developed country, the average increase of output, consumption and 
investment is 15%. Financial technology enhances economic growth significantly, but 
its maximum profitability is obtained when it is used to invest in riskier and more
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profitable projects. The effects of changing the credit recovery efficiency turn out 
to be insignificant since the increase of the net return it produces is substantially 
lower than the increase obtained from high risk-return projects when investing with 
a developed financial technology.
The analysis of the cross-country effects of the change in the financial sector funda­
mentals also allows us to track the transmission mechanism of financial development 
predicted by the model. On the one hand, a better financial technology reduces the 
cost of credit and the NPL rate. This, in turn, increases the net return of investment. 
On the other hand, an exogenous change in the risk-return investment profile only 
has positive effects on output if it is accompanied with a better financial technology. 
This is key to obtain the high return of investment projects with a moderate default 
rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The model is presented in section 
1.2, and the calibration at the steady state in section 1.3. Section 1.4 discusses 
the goodness of the calibration of the model and the relation between the financial 
sector fundamentals and the rest of the economy. The contribution of financial 
development to economic growth and its transmission mechanisms are presented in 
section 1.5. The conclusions are presented in section 1.6.
1.2 T he m odel
The model economy is composed by a measure one of identical and infinitely lived 
agents. Agents are endowed with one unit of time each period, which can be used 
to work and to enjoy leisure. There are two perfectly competitive sectors in which 
they can work: the final goods production (FGP) sector and the financial sector. 
The former produces consumption goods combining capital and labour. To increase 
the stock of capital, which depreciates over time, firms obtain funding from financial 
intermediaries and invest into risky investment projects. Financial intermediaries 
base the loan approval decision on an estimate of the probability of default of each
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investment project, and only approve those from which they expect positive returns.
1.2.1 Final G ood Producers
There is a large number of perfectly competitive final good producers. Each final 
good producer j  produces consumption goods using capital, kj, and labour, 7TJC, 
according to a Cobb-Douglas production function
A fraction S of capital depreciates each period. However, firms have access to an 
infinite set of investment opportunities. Each investment opportunity requires 1 
unit of the consumption good and only a fraction p G (0 ,1) of them deliver positive 
units of the capital good, 77 > 0. These new units of capital become productive the 
following period, and depreciate over time with the rest of capital at a rate 5. The 
remaining investment opportunities, a fraction 1 — p, fail to produce any capital 
good, and consume 1 — r  units of the initial investment, where 0 < t  < 1. All 
variables concerning the investment technology, p, rj and r , are exogenous to final 
good producers and they are known by all agents of the economy. W hat no agent 
knows is which investment opportunities are profitable, and which ones are not.
For each investment project that a FGP wishes to perform, ij)t, it has to apply for 
funding to a financial intermediary. Financial intermediaries base the loan approval 
decision upon an estimate of the probability of default of the investment project. 
The loan application is approved with probability 9t . An investment project that 
obtains funding succeeds with probability qt > p, depending on the accuracy of 
the estimation of the probability of default. This is assumed to be non-observable, 
and hence, final good producers have to take it as given. If the investment project 
succeeds, final good producers pay the lending interest rate If the investment 
project turns out to be non-productive, they can only promise to pay back r . It is 
assumed that they cannot pledge the stock of capital as collateral when applying for
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a loan. However, it is also assumed that financial intermediaries have access to the 
returns from investment projects since they supervise them closely from the moment 
they are initiated. Therefore, the transition equation of capital is:
kj,t (1 &)kj,t—\ T TlQt@tij,t (1*1)
Following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) and Fisher (2006), 77 captures 
the efficiency with which consumption goods are transformed into capital.
Note that while in a traditional RBC model investment is transformed one to one 
into capital, in the current set up the transition equation of capital has a crucial role 
since it connects both sectors. The ability of firms to accumulate capital depends 
on the tightness of lending policies, 0t , and the accuracy of the estimation of the 
probability of default, qt .
The firm’s optimisation problem becomes:
Vjit at, rItt) = max ( (atraj>c>t)afc-7a -  wCytnM  -  )
\  rt J
+0Vj,t+1 {kj,t+il at+i, rt+i)
rK t is the rental rate of capital and wCjt the wage rate. The relative price of capital 
with respect to consumption goods, r*, is,
Qtri qtr 1
rt =
TB,t Qi,t^B,t +  (1 -  Qi,t)r
the first order conditions resemble those obtained with a traditional RBC model,
= { l - a ) y jtt (1.2)
wc,t = ol^ -  (1.3)
n j,c,t
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namely that the marginal cost of both production factors, wCjt for labour and rK>t 
for capital, have to be equal to the marginal profits.
1.2.2 The Financial Sector
The financial sector is populated by a large number of perfectly competitive financial 
intermediaries. Each financial intermediary i has to decide each period how many 
investment projects to analyse i^t , and the accuracy of the analysis it performs. 
As described before, investment projects can be of two types, t t  G (H , L ). Type H  
investment projects are those that deliver r^ t units of the capital good, while type 
L  projects produce zero units of the capital good, and destroy 1 — r  units of the 
initial investment. Financial intermediaries, as the rest of the agents in the economy, 
cannot observe the true type of each project. However, by analysing them, they can 
obtain an imperfect signal about the project type, r]e(H,L). The precision of the 
signal, i.e. the probability that the signal is correct, is given by:
<Pi,t = P(r] = H  \ t t  = H) = 1 -  0.5 exp (L4)
The precision of the signal depends on the amount of resources spent to produce in­
formation, riij , per investment project analysed, i^t: for the same level of resources 
spent, the larger is the number of projects analysed, the lower is going to be the 
quality of the analysis and hence, the precision of the signal produced is going to 
be worse. Following the recently developed micro literature on banking (Hauswald 
and Marquez (2003), D’ella Riccia and Marquez (2006) , Ruckes (2004) and Amian
(2006)), it is assumed that there are two key ingredients that determine the qual­
ity of the information produced: the risk analysis technology available, \ t , which 
is assumed to be exogenous, and the soft information produced by local bankers,
■ Intuitively, if a financial intermediary has no one analysing the investment
2 n i,f , t  captures both the positive effect of spending more time in analysing each investment 
project, and the positive effect of having each financial intermediary closer to its customers, an 
important determinant of the quality of the information produced raised by Hauswald and Marquez
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projects, riijj  =  0, the signal produced will be totally uninformative , i.e. it will 
be independent of the true type of each project, (j>i t  =  0.5. However, the greater 
the amount of labour resources spent in analysing them, or the more efficient is the 
risk analysis technology, the better is the precision of the signal produced. At the 
limit, if the technology available is infinitely precise, or the labour resources used 
are infinitely large, financial intermediaries will be able to distinguish type H  and 
type L projects perfectly, i.e. (j>it will equal 1.
Given that only type H  projects are profitable, financial intermediaries only accept 
to provide funding to those investment projects from which they obtain a positive 
assessment. However, as the information they produce is not perfect, they also end 
up providing funding to the non-profitable investment projects that are misclassified. 
The probability that an investment project is accepted is given by:
0i t =  =  H  | tt = H )P (tt = H) + P{t] = H \  'k = L)P( tt =  L) (1.5)
=  + (! -  '/v X 1 ~ p )
and it depends on both the quality of the information produced by the financial
intermediary, ^  t , and the percentage of type H  and type L projects in the economy,
p, which is assumed to be exogenous.
The final lending of each intermediary i is a fraction Qi)t of all investment projects 
analysed,
h,t (1 ’^ )
and the expected probability of success is given by:
(2005) and Amian (2007).
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a =  _____________ P(n = H \ n  = H )P ( t t  =  H)_____________
Qht P ( T }  = H  I 7T =  H)P{w  =  H) + P (v =  H  \ ir = L)P(tt = L) K ’
_________ |A*P_________
‘/’i.tP +  (! -  -  P)
i.e., the fraction of investment projects that were correctly assessed among all in­
vestment projects accepted.
Intermediaries decide how many investment projects to analyse and the amount 
of labour resources to use in each period, taking r ^ ,  Wfj,  r  and p as given. 
Then, they obtain the returns from lending, which they use to pay back the deposits. 
Financial intermediaries’ optimisation problem is:
Vitt = max {qi,trB,t +  (1 -  qi,t)r) k t  ~  wf,tnij,t -  rDjtd^t (1.8)
(*i,t )
Further insights on the trade off that financial intermediaries face can be obtained 
using equations (1.5), (1.6), (1.7), and the fact that the amount of deposits raised, 
diyt, is equal to the amount of lending, li>t. The maximisation problem becomes:
^ ,t =
max (p0i)t(rB)t -  rDjt)i^t -  (1 -  0M)(1 -  p)(rD,t -  r)zi>t -  wF,tnw ) (1.9)
This shows that the profits of financial intermediaries depend on the income they 
obtain from the interest margin, — r ^ ,  of the projects that succeed, and the 
interest cost, ro,t — t t b j , they suffer from those loans that were misclassified. The 
trade off faced by financial intermediaries consists on increasing their lending by 
augmenting the number of investment projects analysed, at the cost of a worse 
estimation of the probability of default, or to reduce the volume of lending, with the
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benefit of having a pool of loans of better quality. This trade off is reflected in the 
first order conditions:
dd >.■ 4. dd>j f
( r B ,t ~  r Di t ) i i , t P t a — “  +  ( r d,t ~  t )(1 -  — —  =  w F,t ( 1-10)
t (  t \(rB,t -  =  (rB,t -  rD't)ii,tPt-Q7f- +  (rD,t ~ r ) (  1 -  pt) 1 ( 1 -  <j>i f ) +  I
(i'll)
Equation (1.10), the first order condition with respect to shows that an increase 
of the labour force increases its profits to the extend that it improves the quality of 
the information in which they are based when deciding whether to accept or deny a 
borrowing application. A better precision of the signal allows them to increase the 
proportion of lending to profitable projects, and hence, to increase the amount of 
lending from which they obtain a benefit (rB,t — rn,t), and to reduce the amount of 
lending from which they loose (r — r£>,t). Equation (1.11), the first order condition 
with respect to shows that financial intermediaries maximise expected profits 
choosing the amount of investment projects to analyse that balances the increased 
expected income obtained through a higher volume of lending, left hand side of 
the equation, and the reduction of it due to the lower quality of the information 
produced, right hand side of the equation.
1.2.3 Preferences
The model economy is composed by a continuum of measure 1 of infinitely lived 
agents. To maximise the expected present discounted value of utility, agents decide 
how much to consume, how much to save and how much to work at every period. 
That is,
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max E f t  In q  -  nc,t +  nFft
t=o
s.t:
Ct +  dt+1 H— ft-  — wCjtn Cit +  WffTifj  +  rDftdt +  i'K,t~ft (1-12)
f't rt
Where ct is the consumption at period t, dt is the amount of deposits (or savings), kt 
is the capital rented to FGP and ^  is a parameter capturing the disutility of effort.
The first order condition with respect to savings, dt ,
1 =  0 E t ( ^ - r D,t+1)  (1.13)
delivers the standard Euler equation relating present and future consumption as a 
function of the return from savings. A similar Euler equation is obtained from the 
first order condition with respect to capital, kt ,
l  = 0E t [ - ^ ^ ( l - 5 ) r K,t+1) (1.14)
Ct+i rt+1
It takes into account the relative price of investment with respect to consumption 
goods over time.
The supply of labour in each sector is given by,
wc,t =  w F,t = i>ct ( I-15)
1.2.4 Market clearing conditions
The labour demand from both sectors equals the labour supplied by consumers:
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K t  =  K t
K t  =  K ,
And hence, the total number of hours worked in both sectors equals the total 
number of hours worked:
N c,t +  N ftt — N t
The supply of savings of consumers equals the demand of deposits from financial 
intermediaries:
The demand from loans from FGP equals the supply of lending by financial inter­
mediaries:
And the aggregate level of consumption and savings equals the aggregate production 
of consumption goods in the economy:
Ct + Dt = Yt
1.3 C alibration o f th e  m odel at th e  stead y  sta te
As is customary in the literature, the objective is to use the minimum number of 
parameters of the model to match the data. To have a good characterisation of the
O. Aspachs-Bracons 23 Chapter 1
The Effects of Financial Technology and Credit Recovery Efficiency on Economic Growth
financial sector of each country, the key variables of it, the lending rate, r#,, the 
deposit rate, r^ , and the default rate, 1 — q, are calibrated for each country. The 
model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency.
1.3.1 Fixed parameters
The output to capital ratio, Y /K ,  is obtained from the Penn World tables (PW T). 
Briefly, Y  is GDP in purchasing power parity (PPP) in 1996. The capital stock, K , 
is constructed with the perpetual inventory method from time series data on real 
investment (also from the PW T). The depreciation rate of capital , 5, is 0.01.
According to the model, the labor income in the FGP sector to output is
w cNc  
° =  —
This is different from the labor share usually estimated in the literature because it 
does not contain the labor income from the financial sector. To obtain an appropriate 
measure of the labor share, the standard labor share is rescaled by the share of labor 
in the non-financial industry,
«  =  a -
Estimates of the labour share in output, cn*, for each country are obtained from 
Caselli and Feyrer (2007), who expand the cross-country data initiated by Bernanke 
and Gurkaynak (2001) and Gollin (2002), and take into account the employee com­
pensation in the corporate sector from the National Accounts, plus a number of 
adjustments to include the labor income of the self-employed and non-corporate 
employees. The share of labor in the non-financial sector is obtained from the In­
ternational Labor Organisation.
The values of the amount of resources that financial intermediaries recover in case 
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the investment project fails, r ,  for each country are obtained from Djankov, Hart, 
McLiesh and Shleifer (2006), who estimate the average cents of a dollar that are 
recovered after a borrower defaults for a large panel of countries between 2002 and 
2007.
1.3.2 Calibrated parameters
The following 6 parameters are calibrated: the discount factor, /3, the return on 
investment, 77, the fraction of type H  projects, p, the return of capital, r^ , and the 
financial technology, A. The first 3 parameters are chosen so that the model matches 
the following 3 moments: the average real interest rate of deposits, r^ , the average 
real interest rate of lending, r# , and the average default rate of lending, 1 — q.
The calibration of the endogenous parameters proceeds as follows. The discount 
factor is chosen such that the deposit interest rate is equal to the average real 
deposit interest rate for the last ten years at a quarterly frequency.
1
The deposit interest rate for each country is obtained from the IMF International 
Financial Statistics database and is deflated using the CPI. The value for the return 
of capital is obtained combining the two Euler equations, (1.13) and (1.14),
rK = rD ~  (1 -  6)
The lending rate is determined using the first order condition of the FGP optimisa­
tion problem with respect to capital,
qr! (1 -  a) £  
rB = ---------------—
rK
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The value of the fraction of type L investment projects accepted, 1 — q, is equal to 
the average non-performing loans rate of each country. The data is obtained from 
the IMF Financial Soundness Indicators database, which is the result of an effort 
to compile comparable indicators of NPL. In order to use the most comparable set 
of countries, only those reporting the NPL rate at a domestically controlled, cross- 
border and cross-sector consolidation basis are considered. This limits the data set 
to 19 countries. Then, the value chosen for the return of investment, 7 7 , is such that 
the value of the lending rate is equal to the average real reference rate for commercial 
loans (the prime rate) for the last 2 decades.
The value chosen for the fraction of type H  investment projects in the economy, p, 
is such that the fraction of type L investment projects accepted, 1 — q, is equal to 
the average NPL rate described above. To obtain q as a function of p some algebra 
is needed. First, the definition of 0, equation (1.4), is rewritten as,
A ^  =  logT^  (1.16)
Then, the financial technology parameter, A, the labor in the financial sector to 
investment ratio, and the accuracy of the information produced by loan officers, 
0, are substituted for functions of q and p. The labor in the financial sector to 
investment ratio is obtained using the definition of lending, equation (1.6), and the 
first order condition w.r.t. I , equation (1.11),
J _  =  A(1 — <t>)pIM +  IC
Nf  9 N I M  y ' ’
where, /M , is the potential interest margin,
I M  = p(rB -  rD)
IC  is the potential interest cost,
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IC  - (1 - p ) { r D -  t ) 
and N I M  is the net interest margin,
N I M  — qrB +  (1 -  q)r -  rD
The accuracy of the information produced by loan officers, </>, is obtained rewriting 
the definition of the default rate, equation (1.7), as,
4  =  g(l -  p) +  ( 1 -  g)p (L18)
and the function for the financial technology parameter is obtained from the first 
order condition with respect to rif,
\ (i mi
A =  (1 -  <j>)p{IM +  IC)  (1'19)
To evaluate how different financial sectors affect economic development, we also 
obtain the main aggregates of the economy from the calibrated model. Total credit 
is obtained using equation (1.17) and the level of hours worked in the financial sector, 
Nf. This, in turn, requires first to get the relative labour force combining equations 
(1.17) and (1.1),
N f  _  N f  L  K  
~N~C ~  ~ L K W C
w rq (  K
( 1.20)
N I M  5 \ Y
and then, to normalise the total amount of hours worked, N , to 0.3. N f  is,
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7 i +  #
We obtain the values of K  and Y  using the transition equation of capital, equation
(1.1), and the production function of output,
K  = r- ! ^
Y  =  N « K l~a
The level of consumption is obtained using the aggregate budget constrain:
C — Y  — D
1.4 A nalysis o f th e  m odel at th e  stead y  sta te
In this section, first I document the relation between financial sector variables and 
economic development using a cross-country data set. Then, I analyze the cross­
country correlations of the variables obtained from the calibration of the model 
at the steady state. The goodness of the calibration of the model is assessed by 
comparing the cross-correlations generated by the model with those obtained from 
the data. Next, I analyze the relation of the calibrated deep financial sector variables, 
the financial technology parameter and the risk-return profile, with the rest of the 
variables of the financial sector, and the main aggregates of the economy.
1.4.1 Benchmark cross-country correlations
One of the indicators of financial development that has been more widely used is 
the credit to output ratio. The seminal contribution of King and Levine (1993)
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documents its positive relationship with output using a panel of more than 70 coun­
tries. More precisely, they analyze the relation between cross-country averages of 
the credit to output ratio and output growth. This section follows a similar ap­
proach and documents the relation of the credit to output ratio, and other financial 
sector specific variables with output and investment. These variables are the cost of 
credit, the return from savings, the default rate and the credit recovery efficiency. 
The relation between output and the output to capital ratio is also documented. As 
argued in Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2006) and Greenwood, Sanchez and Wang
(2007), capital deepening could be the result of a more efficient financial intermedi­
ation, which, by reducing its costs, increases the relative importance of the capital 
stock on the economy.
Data for output per worker and the output to capital ratio is obtained from the Penn 
World tables. The credit to output ratio is obtained from the World Bank Financial 
Development Indicators, and the lending and deposit rates are obtained from the 
IMF International Financial Statistics. To compare the relation between different 
financial systems and the economy at the steady state, 10 year averages of the data 
are taken. The estimates of the credit recovery efficiency are obtained from Djankov, 
Hart, McLiesh and Shleifer (2006), who estimate the average cents of a dollar that 
are recovered after a borrower defaults for a large panel of countries between 2002 
and 2007. The NPL rate is obtained from the IMF Financial Soundness Indicators. 
Comparable data across countries is only available for the last 5 years and for 19 
countries.
The cross-country correlations are reported in Table (1.1), and Figures (1.1) and
(1.2) present detailed cross-country scatter plots. As it has been widely documented 
by the literature, there is a positive and strong correlation between output per 
worker and the credit to output ratio. This is reassuring since we are dealing with a 
limited data set. Interesting insights are also obtained from the other financial sector 
variables. The real lending and deposit rates are lower in more developed countries. 
The credit recovery efficiency is also highly correlated with economic development,
O. Aspachs-Bracons 29 Chapter 1
The Effects of Financial Technology and Credit Recovery Efficiency on Economic Growth
being higher in richer countries. Finally, the NPL rate is lower in richer countries.
Apart from output, the financial sector variables are also correlated with investment 
and the credit to output ratio. The latter appears to be specially related to the cost 
of credit and the non-performing loans rate: a lower cost of credit and a lower level 
of the default rate are associated with higher levels of the credit to output ratio. 
The output to capital ratio also appears to be strongly and negatively correlated 
with output.
The cross-correlations documented in this section will be later used as a benchmark 
to asses the ability of the model to replicate the data.
1.4.2 Cross-country correlations generated by the m odel
The cross-country correlations of the calibrated variables from the model are com­
pared with those obtained from the data in Table (1.1), and Figures (1.3) to (1.5) 
provide detailed cross-country scatter plots. The relation of output with respect to 
the level of credit as well as the credit to output ratio is qualitatively the same as the 
one documented in the previous section. It is worth noting that the cross-country 
correlation is also quantitatively very similar, indicating a strong and positive rela­
tion between output and credit, as it has been widely documented by the literature. 
The output to capital ratio is also strongly negatively correlated with output and 
credit.
The model also succeeds in replicating the relation between financial sector specific 
variables and aggregate variables: the credit recovery efficiency is positively and 
strongly related with output and credit, the NPL rate is negatively related with 
output and credit, and both, lending and deposits, are cheaper in richer countries.
Regarding the calibrated deep financial variables, the results reported in Table (1.2) 
show that the financial technology is strongly negatively correlated with the NPL 
rate. It is also negatively related to the cost of credit. A better financial technology 
is present in those countries with a more efficient credit recovery rate, and it is
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strongly and positively related with the main economic aggregates, namely credit 
and output.
The risk return investment profile also varies substantially across countries: those 
investing into riskier, but also more profitable projects have a higher level of credit, 
a higher credit to output ratio and higher level of output. Interestingly, even if they 
invest into ex-ante riskier projects, their NPL ratio is lower. This may be the reason 
why, even if ex-ante those projects are riskier, they end up being growth enhancing. 
Given that the financial technology is negatively related to the NPL rate, and it 
is positively related with those countries investing into riskier and more profitable 
projects, it is a good candidate to explain how a riskier investment profile can end 
up being growth enhancing.
The evidence presented so far does not help to identify if the financial sector is 
an engine for economic growth or, on the contrary, if its development is just the 
result of higher economic activity, even if the insights obtained from the calibrated 
financial technology parameter and the risk-return investment profile of each country 
make the later reasoning more difficult to defend. A measure of the importance 
of financial technology to perform riskier investment strategies, and their role in 
fostering economic growth should help answering the question. These are the issues 
tackled in the next section.
1.5 T he effects o f  financial developm ent
This section tries to disentangle the relation between the financial sector funda­
mentals and economic aggregates documented in the previous section. To do so, it 
analyzes the response of the economy to an exogenous change of the financial sector 
fundamentals: the financial technology, A, and the credit recovery efficiency, r. The 
interaction of these changes with a change in the risk-return investment profile is 
also studied. This allows ascertaining if the model attributes part of the output 
differential between countries to differences in the financial sector fundamentals.
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Furthermore, analyzing the impact that these exogenous changes have at the dif­
ferent stages of financial development provides some information about the channel 
through which financial development contributes to economic growth.
Re-calibrating the model
In order to analyze how changes in financial technology, the credit recovery effi­
ciency and the risk-return investment profile affect economic growth, p,r, r  and 
A are treated as exogenous parameters, and r s , Q and Y /K  are endogenously 
determined.
The calibration of the endogenous parameters proceeds as follows: to obtain the new 
default rate, 1 — q, we fix p using equation (1.5). We also have to rewrite equation 
(1.4) as,
f  = i log( ^ y )  (1-21)
the first order condition from the financial intermediaries problem with respect to 
/ ,  equation(1.11), as,
(a(1 -  0)(1 -  2p) + T ^ ) r D + (a(1 -  <£)(1 -  p) -  -f a )  T
’■* ■ 1  c  -  4  -  -  *>p-------------------  ILMI
the first order condition of FGP with respect to capital, equation (1.2), as,
Y  rK
K  r( 1 — a)
and the first order condition of FGP with respect to labor,
(1.23)
w =  a  ( T )  (1.24)
Finally, rewriting the first order condition with respect to N f ,equation (1.10), as,
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1 ^ A(p(rB - r jD) +  ( l - p ) ( r £>- r ) )  ^ '25^
The value of 4> is obtained after replacing equations (1.7), (1.21), (1.22), (1.23) and
(1.24) in equation (1.25). The new value of the default rate, 1 — q, is obtained using 
equation (1.7). Then, the new lending rate is obtained using equations (1.21) and 
(1.22), and the new output to capital ratio from equation (1.23). The values for the 
total output, credit and consumption are obtained as before.
Exogenous changes in financial development
To study the effect that financial sector fundamentals may have on economic growth 
the value of the financial technology and the credit recovery efficiency of each country 
are exogenously changed for the values calibrated for Finland, who has the most 
developed financial sector. The same is done for the risk-return investment profile.
The first two columns of Table (1.3) present the average cross-country effect of the 
change in financial technology and the credit recovery. A better financial technology 
reduces the default rate substantially. It also has a negative impact on the cost of 
credit and a positive impact on the economic aggregates. The results from changing 
the credit recovery efficiency go in the opposite direction. Even if a higher financial 
recovery efficiency reduces the cost of credit, the resultant increase in the return 
leads financial intermediaries to increase the volume of credit without increasing 
the accuracy of the information produced accordingly. The result is a significant 
increase of the default rate that ends up hurting consumption and output.
The effects of having a more risky and more profitable investment profile are pre­
sented in columns (3) to (6). If the financial technology and the recovery efficiency 
are kept fix, investing into riskier projects has highly damaging effects for the econ­
omy. The cost of credit and the default rate soar, while the levels of consumption, 
credit and output are depleted. Things change a lot when the value of the financial 
technology is also changed. A better financial technology allows investing in riskier
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projects with a lower default rate and a lower cost of credit. By extracting the 
maximum benefit from the high yielding projects, all aggregates rise substantially. 
The interaction between financial technology and the risk-return investment profile 
appears to be crucial to enhance economic growth. As it could be expected from 
the results obtained in column (2), a better credit recovery efficiency does not add 
much to it.
The transmission channel of financial development
This section exploits the cross-section variation of changing the financial technology, 
the credit recovery efficiency and the risk-return investment profile of countries to 
better understand the transmission channel of financial development produced by 
the model. The results are presented in Table (1.4). The first raw shows that poorer 
countries are those experiencing higher increases of the financial technology, and 
that the higher is the change in the financial technology, the higher is the increase 
of output, credit and consumption. A similar reasoning applies for the risk-return 
investment profile: poorer countries are those investing into safer and less profitable 
projects, and are those that benefit more from changing the investment profile.
To see how the change in financial technology and the risk-return investment profile 
ends up affecting the aggregate variables, first it is analyzed how the financial vari­
ables change. Then i t ’s analyzed how these changes are related with the changes 
of the aggregate variables. As shown in the right hand side of Table (1.4), greater 
improvements of the financial technology are related to greater drops in the cost of 
credit and the default rate, and to greater increases in the net return of investment. 
The return of investment also has a direct impact on the net return of it, as well as 
on the cost of credit. Finally, the countries that experience greater increases in the 
risk profile of their investment are those who see greater drops on the default rate.
In turn, the changes of the financial variables are also related to changes of the 
main aggregates. The results are presented in the last 3 rows of Table (1.4). The 
net return of investment and the cost of credit are strongly related to the aggregate
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ones. On the one hand, greater changes in the net return of investment are strongly 
positively related to greater changes in output, consumption and credit. On the 
other hand, the greater is the reduction of the cost of credit, the greater is the 
increase in output, consumption and credit. The default rate does not have a direct 
impact on the aggregate variables, and it only operates through improving the net 
return of investment and reducing the cost of credit.
Finally, there are signs that capital deepening occurs as a result of financial devel­
opment, at least in part.
1.6 C onclusions
The recent empirical literature studying the impact that the financial sector has 
on economic growth concludes that it is significant and positive. However, we still 
lack a measure of the size of that impact. This paper takes a step forward on this 
direction by analyzing the effect of exogenous changes in the financial technology 
on output. To do so, I construct a dynamic general equilibrium model with two 
sectors: a sector that produces consumption goods an invests into capital goods, 
and a financial sector that provides funds and credit risk assessment to final good 
producers to invest in capital goods.
The model is calibrated for a panel of countries. The goodness of the calibration is 
assessed by comparing the cross-country correlations generated by the model with 
those obtained from a cross-country data set. The model turns out to replicate 
them fairly well. The calibration of the model at the steady state also allows us to 
obtain calibrated values of the financial technology and the risk return investment 
profile for each country. A better financial technology is associated with lower levels 
of the non-performing loans rate and cheaper credit. As expected, richer countries 
are those with a better financial technology. It is also found that richer countries 
perform ex-ante riskier, but more profitable, investments.
The importance of financial development for economic growth is studied from the
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effects of exogenous changes in the financial technology, exogenous changes in the 
credit recovery efficiency and their interaction with changes in the risk-return in­
vestment profile. It is found that the benefits from a better financial technology are 
maximized when it is used to invest into riskier, but more profitable, investment 
projects. The average cross-country increase of output is 15%.
Analysing the cross-section effects of the exogenous changes in the financial tech­
nology, the financial recovery efficiency and the risk-return investment profile allows 
us to track the transmission mechanism of financial development generated by the 
model. On the one hand, higher increases of the financial technology are associated 
with higher drops of the cost of credit, higher drops of the rates of non-performing 
loans and higher increases of the returns from investment. On the other hand, ex- 
ante riskier, but more profitable, investment profiles are associated with higher levels 
of the net-return of investment, provided that a country has access to a developed 
financial technology. Cheaper access to credit and higher net returns of investment 
are, in turn, strongly and positively associated to economic development.
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C fl
® Cross-country correlations: actuals vs. m odel predictions
Output Investment Credit to Output
actuals calibrated actuals calibrated actuals calibrated
Output 0.53
(0.04)
0.92
(0.00)
0.70
(0.00)
0.67
(0.01)
Output to capital ratio -0.74
(0.00)
-0.89
(0.00)
-0.69
(0.00)
-0.69
(0.00)
-0.33
(0.23)
-0.35
(0.21)
Lending rate
co00
-0.50
(0.06)
-0.40
(0.14)
-0.36
(0.19)
-0.36
(0.19)
-0.46
(0.09)
-0.24
(0.40)
Deposit rate -0.41
(0.12)
-0.43
(0.11)
-0.44
(0.10)
-0.44
(0.10)
-0.23
(0.41)
-0.36
(0.19)
Non-performing loans rate -0.40
(0.14)
-0.36
(0.19)
-0.38
(0.16)
-0.38
(0.16)
-0.47
(0.08)
-0.34
(0.22)
Credit recovery efficiency 0.58
(0.02)
0.51
(0.05)
0.56
(0.03)
0.56
(0.03)
0.26
(0.34)
0.54
(0.04)
Table 1.1: Stylised facts and predictions from the model. The p-values of the pairwise correlations are in parenthesis
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Cross-country correlations o f the non-observable variables calibrated
Financial technology Ex-ante risk of investment Net return of investment
Output 0.57 0.55 0.64
(0.03) (0.04) (0.01)
Investment 0.62 0.62 0.32
(0.01) (0.01) (0.24)
Credit to Output 0.54 0.56 -0.09
(0.04) (0.03) (0.74)
Lending rate -0.35 -0.21 -0.40
(0.20) (0.45) (0.14)
Deposit rate -0.39 -0.34 -0.40
(0.15) (0.21) (0.14)
Non-performing loans rate -0.68 -0.57 -0.14
(0.00) (0.03) (0.61)
Credit Recovery Efficiency 0.61 0.56 0.31
(0.02) (0.03) (0.26)
Table 1.2: The p-values of the pairwise correlations are in parenthesis
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A verage (%) effects of changes in,
Financial Technology 
Recovery Efficiency 
Risk-Return inv. Profile
v
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
V
lending rate -0.80 -0.17 296.09 -0.40 266.09 -0.41
default rate -92.23 73.50 7509.69 -76.91 8702.29 -71.88
consumption 0.51 -0.13 -32.88 15.30 -33.51 15.30
investment 1.15 0.26 -63.88 15.47 -61.36 15.48
output to capital ratio -1.01 0.35 227.50 -21.95 240.46 -21.94
output 0.70 -0.02 -41.86 15.36 -41.59 15.36
Table 1.3: "v" indicates which exogenous shock is active.
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Aggregate Variables Financial Variables
y0 AV AI AC  AY K  A (qn) ArB A(1 -  q)
D irect e ffects
Change in financial tech. -0.5421* 0.3403 0.3328 0.3463 -0.3196 0.4133 -0.6480* -0.8153*
Change o f return o f inv. -0.6680* 0.9661* 0.9585* 0.9681* -0.9769* 0.9998* -0.4033 -0.0332
Change o f risk -0.2200 -0.1879 -0.2151 -0.1771 0.0753 -0.0977 0.3219 -0.4877*
In d irec t effects
Change o f net ret. o f inv. -0.6721* 0.9661* 0.9585* 0.9681* -0.9748*
Change o f lending rate 0.2768 -0.4911* -0.5087* -0.4846* 0.2835
Change o f default rate 0.353 -0.0166 -0.0142 -0.0208 -0.0735
Table 1.4: The transmission channel of financial developement
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Figure 1.1: Stylised facts: cross-country scatter plots.
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Figure 1.2: Stylised facts: cross-country scatter plots.
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Figure 1.3: Stylised facts: cross-country scatter plots from the calibrated model.
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Croos-correlations of the Reco/ery Rate
•COL
•ISR
•  PHL
• F R A  * ' T A  • A « « E L  •  #(JSA
• sweI ^
2 4 6 .8
recovery rate given default
E ° 
*5
♦ITA
•  PHL •  COL
♦FRA
•AUT
•ISR *BEL
♦GBR
♦ FIN
0 2 4 .6 .8 1
recovery rale g iven  d e f a i t
^ -
*ITA * ^ T
V " ~
CD
Is c o  _(r>
♦ A U ^ o k m
f»*AU S ^ESP *CAN C CO .o
•  PHL
•USA
•IRL
in T -'C
CDC -  ro
♦BEL 
•  USA jheSC
•COL
Xo - ♦PHL •l^FR 4GWiJ T
.2 4 6 .8 1
recovery rate given default
.2 4 .6 .8
recovery r a t  g iven  d efa u t
Figure 1.4: Stylised facts: cross-country scatter plots from the calibrated model.
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Chapter 2
Credit Standards Cycles
The loose credit standard policies that loan officers took during the 
2000s’ credit boom are at the root of the 2007/08 global financial turmoil 
(Bernanke (2007) and Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2008)). To study 
the impact of such policies on the economy as well as the mechanisms 
behind them, this paper presents a Real Business Cycle model with 
two sectors, a standard production sector and a productive financial 
sector. The former obtains funding from the latter to invest in risky 
investment opportunities. The latter bases the loan approval decisions 
on estimates of the probability of default of each investment project. The 
model is calibrated for the US and is able to replicate the counter-cyclical 
pattern of credit standards documented by the literature. The increase 
in the probability of default during expansionary periods reduces the 
efficiency with which investment is transformed into capital. In addition, 
the increase in the default rate reduces the return of savings, which 
in turn reduces the labor supply. The effect of counter-cyclical credit 
standards is especially important for investment specific shocks.
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2.1 In troduction
The loose credit standard policies that loan officers took during the 2000s’ US credit 
boom were determinant for the deterioration of banks’ balance sheets and, ulti­
mately, for the 2007/08 global financial turmoil. This has been highlighted by the 
chairman of the Federal Reserve Ben S. Bernanke,
"The practices of some mortgage originators have also contributed to 
the problems in the subprime sector. ...some lenders evidently loosened 
underwriting standards. ...The accuracy of much of the information on 
which the underwriting was based is also open to question. As the prob­
lems in the subprime mortgage market have become manifest, we have 
seen some signs of self-correction in the market. Investors are scrutiniz­
ing subprime loans more carefully and, in turn, lenders have tightened 
underwriting standards."
Ben S. Bernanke, 43rd Annual Conference on Bank Structure and Competition, 
Chicago. May 17, 2007.
Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2008) provide formal evidence for this phenomenon 
by identifying a decrease in the lending standards which is not explained by an 
improvement in the underlying economic fundamentals. To do so, they study the 
relationship between the recent boom and current delinquencies in the US subprime 
mortgage market using a data set that combines 50 million individual loan applica­
tions, local and national data.
Counter-cyclical credit standard policies have also been identified during other eco­
nomic cycles. Jimenez and Saurina (2006) use Spanish individual loan data between 
1980 and 2000 and show that loans made during periods of high credit growth have 
a higher probability of default. Asea and Bloomberg (1998) use aggregate data for 
the US and show that the probability that a loan is collateralised increases during
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contractions and decreases during expansions, and Lown and Morgan (2006) use the 
US Loan Officer Survey and find that tighter lending standards are related with pe­
riods of low economic and credit growth. Berger and Udell (2004) show that banks 
find it harder to recruit experienced and qualified loan officers to keep up with the 
rapid pace of loan applications, leading to a deterioration in loan processing and 
risk assessment procedures.
There are several mechanisms that incite loan officers to perform counter-cyclical 
credit standards policies. Ruckes (2004) argues that when the fraction of good loan 
applicants is high enough the incentives to generate (costly) information about their 
probability of default decrease since a lower fraction of them will be screened out. 
D ’ella Riccia and Marquez (2006) argue that the incentives to generate information 
about borrowers are low when large number of new applicants reduce the adverse 
selection problem that arises from informational asymmetries among lenders. These 
episodes, which are assumed to characterise expansionary periods, lead to a reduc­
tion in lending standards. Rajan (1994) argues that rational bank managers with 
short horizons set credit policies which influence, and are influenced by other banks 
and demand side conditions. This leads to a theory of low frequency business cycles 
driven by bank credit policies.
The aim of the present paper is to study the impact of credit standards policies to the 
economy as well as the mechanisms behind them. To abstract from the effect that 
other variables have on the evolution of credit over the business cycle, this paper 
develops a dynamic general equilibrium model with financial intermediaries that 
choose at each period the optimal credit standards. The effects of credit standards 
are studied from the impulse response functions and the moments of the simulated 
linear model.
The theoretical approach consists on integrating a productive banking sector into 
a standard Real Business Cycle model. Both sectors, the standard final goods pro­
duction (FGP) sector and the financial sector, are perfectly competitive. The FGP 
sector combines labor and capital to produce consumption goods. To increase the
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stock of capital, which depreciates over time, firms obtain funding from financial 
intermediaries and invest into risky investment opportunities. Financial intermedi­
aries base the loan approval decision on an estimate of the probability of default of 
each investment project. The production structure of the financial sector is similar 
to that of Hauswald and Marquez (2003) and Ruckes (2006), in which the default 
rate depends on the resources that banks spend generating information about the 
quality of each investment project to be financed. Hence, in the context of the 
model, financial intermediaries relax the credit standards when the loan approval 
decisions rely on less informed credit assessments. And vice versa, they tighten them 
when they are certain that the investment project will succeed.
The model is calibrated at the steady state using US quarterly data to match the 
main economic aggregates as well as financial sector variables: the default rate, and 
the lending and deposit real interest rates.
The behavior of credit standards over the business cycle is studied from the impulse 
response functions to a technology shock and an investment specific shock, as well 
as the correlations of the simulated linear model. According to the literature, these 
are the most important shocks (Greenwood, Hercowitz and Krusell (1997), Fisher 
(2006), Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), and Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti 
(2008)), at least for output, investment, hours and capital, which are the variables 
we are interested in. Financial intermediaries respond to both shocks by increasing 
their lending, as is customary in the literature. In addition, the quality of the 
information in which loan approvals is based deteriorates. Therefore, we observe 
that after positive technology shocks and investment specific shocks the default rate 
increases. The correlation of the simulated model with investment specific shocks 
confirms that the probability of default of loans made during expansions is higher, 
while the cross-correlation obtained when simulating the model with technology 
shocks is also positive but much lower.
To better grasp the role played by financial intermediaries, we take advantage of the 
fact that the standard Real Business Cycle model is a particular case of the model
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with financial intermediaries. More precisely, the existence of a financial sector de­
pends on the degree of development of the financial technology. As the financial 
technology becomes more accurate, the amount of resources spent by financial in­
termediaries in generating information about loan applications decrease. At the 
limit, the model becomes a standard real business cycle model with only one sector. 
Therefore, the comparison between both models facilitates the understanding of the 
channel through which the decisions of loan officers modify the effects of technology 
shocks and investment shocks, as well as their economic impact. In this regard, 
the paper finds that the two economies behave quite similarly when they are hit 
with a technology shock, but this is not the case for an investment shock because 
of the strong and persistent impact it has on the return of capital. This incites 
loan officers to expand the lending supply even if it comes at the cost of a higher 
default rate, which can be compensated with an increase of the interest margin. The 
effects of lending policies on output, which are sizeable in comparison to the one 
sector model, operate through two channels. On the one hand, the increase in the 
default rate reduces the efficiency with which investment is transformed into capi­
tal. Hence, for the same increase of investment the capital accumulation is lower. 
On the other hand, the increase in the default rate reduces the return of savings. 
This reduces the wealth effect generated by the shock, which in turn reduces the 
increase of the labor supply. Thus, two main conclusions can be extracted from 
comparing the general model with financial intermediaries and the one sector RBC 
model. First, lending policies are far from being constant over the business cycle, 
neither quantitatively nor qualitatively. This feature could not be captured with 
a one sector RBC model because it treats the financial sector as a clearing sector 
between savers and investors. Second, capturing the response of the financial sector 
policies to technology and investment shocks is important to the extent that their 
actions have important consequences to the performance of the rest of the economy.
The present paper is related to the literature that studies the effects of credit avail­
ability on business cycle fluctuations. This literature argues that the Modigliani-
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Miller theorem does not apply in the financial sector due to the presence of a moral 
hazard conflict between borrowers and lenders. This conflict might be present be­
tween entrepreneurs and banks (Repullo and Suarez (1996) and Stein (2000)), be­
tween households and banks (Iacoviello and Neri (2006) and Aoki (2004)), between 
depositors and banks (Bernanke and Gertler (1999), Kiyotaki and Moore (1997), 
Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Bolton and Freixas (2006)), or between both deposi­
tors and banks, and banks and borrowers (Holmstrom and Tirole (1996)). In either 
case, the moral hazard problem between borrowers and lenders tights the amount 
of credit that each agent can obtain to the collateral it can pledge. Therefore, the 
evolution of credit over the business cycle not only responds to the traditional sup­
ply and demand forces, but also to changes in collateral values. The mechanism 
presented in this paper abstracts from the collateral channel and it is not based 
on a departure from the Modigliani-Miller theorem: all agents have perfect access 
to credit as long as the expected net present value of investment is positive. In­
stead, it relies on how banks manage the quality and the size of their loan portfolio. 
This channel was not active in the previous literature since the quality of the loan 
portfolio was kept fix. Both channels should be seen as complementary.
The present paper is also connected to the literature that considers the financial 
sector as a productive industry rather than a passive sector that just clears the 
savings from depositors and the demand of funds from investors, and remains passive 
over the business cycle. Boyd and Prescott (1986) were the first to model financial 
intermediaries as productive coalitions that generate information about borrowers 
in a static general equilibrium set up. A more recent strand of the literature has 
followed a partial equilibrium approach to analyse the effects of competition on 
the incentives to produce information about borrowers (von Thaden (1998) and 
Hauswald and Marquez (2003) and (2006)). There is as well a recent empirical 
literature studying the role of the soft information produced by loan officers for the 
competition structure of the financial industry in general, and the loan pricing and 
loan approval decisions in particular (Degryse and Ongena (2005), Amian (2007)
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Jimenez, Peydro, Ongena and Saurina (2007)).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2.2 describes the model and 
section 2.3 discusses the stationary version of it. The calibration of the model is 
presented in section 2.4, and the results are discussed in section 2.5. Section 2.6 
discusses the robustness checks. The concluding remarks are presented in section 
2.7.
2.2 T he m odel
The model economy is composed by a measure one of identical and infinitely lived 
agents. Each period they are endowed with one unit of time, which can be used to 
work and to enjoy leisure. There are two perfectly competitive sectors in which they 
can work: the final goods production (FGP) sector and the financial sector. The 
former produces consumption goods combining capital and labour. To increase the 
stock of capital, which depreciates over time, firms obtain funding from financial 
intermediaries and invest into risky investment projects. Financial intermediaries 
base the loan approval decision on an estimate of the probability of default of each 
investment project, and only approve those from which they expect positive returns.
2.2.1 Final Good Producers
There is a large number of perfectly competitive final good producers. Each final 
good producer j  produces consumption goods using capital, kj, and labour, 77,J)C, 
according to a Cobb-Douglas production function
<:,«)“ kj,t “
where at is a unit root economy wide technology shock with drift. In logs,
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log at = log at_i +  +  ea>t
where /ipa is the growth rate of the economy and ea^t is i.i.d.N(0,al).
A fraction S of capital depreciates at each period. However, firms have access to 
an infinite set of investment opportunities. Each investment opportunity requires 1 
unit of the consumption good and only a fraction p G ( 0 , 1 )  of them deliver positive 
units of the capital good, > 0.  This new units of capital become productive the 
following period, and depreciate over time with the rest of capital at a rate S. The 
remaining investment opportunities, a fraction 1 — p, fail to produce any capital 
good, and consume 1 — r  units of the initial investment, where 0 < r  < 1. All 
variables concerning the investment technology, p, r j jt and r , are exogenous to final 
good producers and they are known by all agents of the economy. W hat no agent 
knows is which investment opportunities are profitable, and which ones are not.
For each investment project that a FGP wishes to perform, it has to apply for 
funding to a financial intermediary. Financial intermediaries base the loan approval 
decision upon an estimate of the probability of default of the investment project. 
The loan application is approved with probability 6t . An investment project that 
obtains funding succeeds with probability qt > p , depending on the accuracy of 
the estimation of the probability of default. This is assumed to be non-observable, 
and hence, final good producers have to take it as given. If the investment project 
succeeds, final good producers pay the lending interest rate If the investment 
project turns out to be non-productive, they can only promise to pay back r. It is 
assumed that they cannot pledge the stock of capital as collateral when applying for 
a loan. However, it is also assumed that financial intermediaries have access to the 
returns from investment projects since they supervise them closely from the moment 
they are initiated. Therefore, the transition equation of capital is:
fcj,t (I T ^I,tQt@j,t (2 .1)
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Following Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) and Fisher (2006), 77  ^ can be 
interpreted as an investment specific technology shock affecting the efficiency with 
which consumption goods are transformed into capital. It is assumed that it follows 
an exogenous AR(1) process
log rht =  V7/ log r i,t-i +  er>t
where er>t is i.i.d.N(0, a*).
Note that while in a traditional RBC model investment is transformed one to one 
into capital, in the current set up the transition equation of capital has a crucial role 
since it connects both sectors. The ability of firms to accumulate capital depends 
on the tightness of lending policies, Qu and the accuracy of the estimation of the 
probability of default, qt .
Firm ’s optimisation problem becomes:
Vj,t (kj,u at , rItt) = max ( (atnjiCtt)ak] ta -  wCitnjjCtt -
\  ’ rt
+ P V j , t + 1 ( k j , t + u  a t + i , r t + i )
rx,t is the rental rate of capital and wCit the wage rate. The relative price of capital 
with respect to consumption goods, rt , is,
Qtri qtri
n  =
rB,t Qi,trB,t +  (1 -  % t ) r  
the first order conditions resemble those obtained with a traditional RBC model,
r K,t~r^ =  (1 — a ) Vj,t (2.2)
>t
Wc,t =  (2.3)
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namely that the marginal cost of both production factors, wcj  for labour and rx,t 
for capital, have to be equal to the marginal profits.
2.2.2 The Financial Sector
The financial sector is populated by a large number of perfectly competitive financial 
intermediaries. Each financial intermediary i has to decide each period how many 
investment projects to analyse , and the accuracy of the analysis it performs. 
As described before, investment projects can be of two types, 7re(H,L). Type H  
investment projects are those that deliver r^ t units of the capital good, while type 
L projects produce zero units of the capital good, and destroy 1 — r  units of the 
initial investment. Financial intermediaries, as the rest of the agents in the economy, 
cannot observe the true type of each project. However, by analysing them, they can 
obtain an imperfect signal about the project type, 77 G (H , L ). The precision of the 
signal, i.e. the probability that the signal is correct, is given by:
=  P (V = H  | 7T =  H)  =  1 -  0.5 exp (2-4)
The precision of the signal depends on the amount of resources spent to produce in­
formation, riij , per investment project analysed, \ t: for the same level of resources 
spent, the larger is the number of projects analysed, the lower is going to be the 
quality of the analysis and hence, the precision of the signal produced is going to 
be worse. Following the recently developed micro literature on banking (Hauswald 
and Marquez (2003), D’ella Riccia and Marquez (2006) , Ruckes (2004) and Amian
(2006)), it is assumed that there are two key ingredients that determine the qual­
ity of the information produced: the risk analysis technology available, Xt , which 
is assumed to be exogenous, and the soft information produced by local bankers, 
U i j / .  Intuitively, if a financial intermediary has no one analysing the investment
captures both the positive effect of spending more time in analysing each investment 
project, and the positive effect of having each financial intermediary closer to its customers, an 
important determinant of the quality of the information produced raised by Hauswald and Marquez
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projects, =  0, the signal produced will be totally uninformative , i.e. it will 
be independent of the true type of each project, (f)i t  =  0.5. However, the greater 
the amount of labour resources spent in analysing them, or the more efficient the 
risk analysis technology is, the better the precision of the signal produced. At the 
limit, if the technology available is infinitely precise, or the labour resources used 
are infinitely large, financial intermediaries will be able to distinguish type H  and 
type L projects perfectly, i.e. <j>i t will equal 1.
It is assumed that the financial technology grows according to the following exoge­
nous process,
log \ t =  log A*_i +  'ipx +  e\,t
where the growth rate is given by ipx and ex,t is i .i.d.N(0, a2x).
Given that only type H  projects are profitable, financial intermediaries only accept 
to provide funding to those investment projects from which they obtain a positive 
assessment. However, as the information they produce is not perfect, they also end 
up providing funding to the non-profit able investment projects that are misclassified. 
The probability that an investment project is accepted is given by:
0lt = p (tj = h \ tt = H)P{tt = H) + P(r] = H\ 7r  = L)P(ir = L) (2.5) 
=  0i,*p + (1 - < M ( 1 - p )
and it depends on both the quality of the information produced by the financial 
intermediary, t , and the percentage of type H  and type L  projects in the economy 
p, which is assumed to be exogenous.
The final lending of each intermediary i is a fraction 6ijt of all investment projects 
analysed, Zjjt:
(2005) and Amian (2007).
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h,t = Oi,tU,t (2.6)
and the expected probability of success is given by:
„ =  _____________ P(y =  H \ *  =  H) P( x  =  H)_____________
9,|t P(r) = H  I 7T =  H )P (7T =  H) + P(r) = H  I 7T =  L)P(n  =  L) K ' 1 
________ <KtP_________
i.e., the fraction of investment projects that were correctly assessed among all in­
vestment projects accepted.
Intermediaries decide how many investment projects to analyse and the amount 
of labour resources to use in each period, taking rB,u rB,t, Wfjt, r  and p as given. 
Then, they obtain the returns from lending, which they use to pay back the deposits. 
Financial intermediaries’ optimisation problem is:
Vi>t =  max {qi,trB,t +  (1 -  qi,t)r) k,t ~  ~  rDttdi,t (2.8)
Further insights on the trade off that financial intermediaries face can be obtained 
using equations (2.5), (2.6), (2.7), and the fact that the amount of deposits raised, 
is equal to the amount of lending, l^t . The maximisation problem becomes:
V-ft =
max M itt(rB,t ~  rD,t ) \ t  ~  (1 -  0M)( 1 -  p){rD,t ~ r )i i>t -  wu ni>u) (2.9)
(^ i,t )
This shows that the current value of financial intermediaries depends on the income 
they obtain from the interest margin, r B : t  ~ r D , t ,  o f  the projects that succeed, and
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the interest cost, rB,t ~  tvb,u they suffer from those loans that were misclassified. 
The trade off faced by financial intermediaries consists on increasing their lending 
by augmenting the number of investment projects analysed, at the cost of a worse 
estimation of the probability of default, or to reduce the volume of lending, with the 
benefit of having a pool of loans of better quality. This trade off is reflected in the 
first order conditions:
d<t>i t dd), t
( r B ,t ~  r D , t ) i i , t P t a—“  + ( r d,t P t ) h , t^—— = w/,t (2.10)
dd); f f  dd>j f \
(r B,t ~  r D t )pt4>i,t =  ( r B,t ~  r Dft) i i , tP t -gT^ +  (r D.t ~  r)(l  - p t ) ( (1 -  4>,.t) +  7 J
(2.11)
Equation (2.10), the first order condition with respect to shows that an increase 
of the labour force increases its profits to the extent that it improves the quality of 
the information in which they are based when deciding whether to accept or deny a 
borrowing application. A better precision of the signal allows them to increase the 
proportion of lending to profitable projects, and hence, to increase the amount of 
lending from which they obtain a benefit (rB,t ~  ^D,t): and to reduce the amount of 
lending from which they loose it (r — r^j ) .  Equation (2.11), the first order condition 
with respect to ijjt, shows that financial intermediaries maximise expected profits 
choosing the amount of investment projects to analyse that balances the increased 
expected income obtained through a higher volume of lending (left hand side of 
the equation), and the reduction of it due to the lower quality of the information 
produced (right hand side of the equation).
2.2.3 Preferences
The model economy is composed by a continuum of measure 1 of infinitely lived 
agents. To maximise the expected present discounted value of utility, agents decide
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how much to consume, how much to save and how much to work at every period. 
That is,
s.t:
fct 1 kt
Ct +  dt+1 H— =  ^c,t^c,t +  Wf,tnf,t +  rD,tdt +  (1 — S +  r x , t ) y  (2-12)
Where ct is the consumption at period t, dt are the savings they lend to financial
intermediaries and ro,t their return. kt is the capital rented to FGP at the rental 
rate r# )t, p  is the inverse of the labour supply elasticity (the Frisch elasticity) and 
n is the labour supply index. Horvath (2000) and Iacoviello and Neri (2006) have 
documented the existence of imperfect substitutability of labor across sectors and 
the importance to capture them when analyzing business cycle fluctuations. Then, 
the labor supply index is defined as follows,
7i t = [x~L {ncj ) 1+L +  (1 -  x ) -t (nu )1+t] 1+1 , where i > 0 (2.13)
where k  is the weight each sector has in the utility function and the parameter
l measures the degree of labour market rigidities in reallocating the labour force 
instantaneously across sectors. If t = 0, labor can be reallocated freely. The degree 
of imperfect substitutability of labour across sectors increases with l .
The first order condition with respect to savings, dt ,
1 = PEt ( ^ - r At+1)  (2.14)
delivers the standard Euler equation relating present and future consumption as a 
function of the return from savings. A similar Euler equation is obtained from the 
first order condition with respect to capital, kt ,
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l  = p E t ( - ^ - ( l - 5  + rK,t+1) ^ ~ )  (2.15)
VQ+i rt+iJ
Finally, the first order conditions that determine the optimal amount of effort to 
exert in each sector are,
» r v i K ) ‘ =  —  (2.i6)
raT1'(1 - * r ( n ( ) ‘ =  (2.17)
2.2.4 Market Clearing conditions
The labour demand from both sectors equals the labour supplied by consumers:
K t  =  N c,t
N u  = N h
And hence, the total number of hours worked in both sectors equals the total 
number of hours worked:
N c , t  +  N f j  =  N t
The supply of savings of consumers equals the demand of deposits from financial 
intermediaries:
Det =  Df
The demand of loans from FGP equals the supply of lending by financial interme-
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diaries:
And the aggregate level of consumption and savings equal the aggregate production 
of consumption good in the economy:
2.2.5 A particular case: the one sector Real Business Cycle 
m odel
As mentioned in the introduction, the standard real business cycle model is a par­
ticular case of the model developed in the present paper. Understanding the link
plays over the business cycle.
The existence of a financial sector depends on the financial technology. For in­
termediate levels of it, it is worth having some labor resources spent on creating 
information about investment projects. However, when the financial technology is 
infinitely precise, the contribution of labor resources tends to zero. This is illustrated 
in the first order conditions of financial intermediaries, (2.10) and (2.11), which can 
be re-written as,
Ct + D t = Yt = N “tK ] - a
between both of them makes clear the nature of the financial sector and the role it
WU  =  (1 -  <Pt)^  (p(rB,t -  rD,t) +  (1 -  p ) ( r D,t ~  r)) (2.18)
(qtTB.t + (1 -  Qt)T -  rd)t) lt = wfxtn fxt (2.19)
Equation (2.18), the first order condition with respect to ny, shows that as the fi­
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nancial technology tends to infinity, A —> oo, financial intermediaries can distinguish 
perfectly between type H  and type L investment projects, 0 —> 1, and hence the 
value added of labor resources tends to zero, Wfit —> 0. Equation (2.19) implies that 
the savings rate and the deposit rate will be the same in this case, rs,t — rD,t•
Therefore, the consumers budget constraint collapses to,
Q +  dt+i H— r— =  WctUct +  rD,tdt +  (1 — S +  r^ t )  — 
rt rt
The maximisation problem of final goods producers remains unchanged, but their 
possibilities to accumulate capital are much higher since the default rate is zero, 
Qt =  1 .
2.3 T he sta tion ary  m odel
The model is assumed to exhibit long run growth so that the moments obtained 
from the simulated linear model can be compared with those obtained from the real 
data. Before calibrating the model at the steady state, the variables have to be 
detrended to obtain a stationary economy.
From the definition of output,
Yt =  {<knc,t)akl~a
and the fact that the number of hours worked is stationary, the growth rate of output 
is equal to,
g y  = ( 9 k f ~ a
Where gx is the growth rate of variable x. The transition equation of capital, 
equation (2.1), establishes that the growth rate of capital and the growth rate of
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investment must be the same, 9k  = 9 d - And from the feasibility constraint it can be 
concluded that output, consumption and savings grow at the same rate:
Ct-1 A -1
9Y,t =  9c,t~rp 9 D , ttv—
b - 1 it-1
Therefore, output, as well as the rest of the non-stationary variables, must grow at 
the same rate of technology, gy =  ga-
For the model to be stationary, the technology in the FGP sector and the financial 
technology must grow at the same rate, ga — 9
2.4 C alibration  o f th e  m odel at th e  stead y  sta te
As is customary in the literature, the objective is to use the minimum number of 
parameters of the model to match the data. To have a proper characterisation of 
the financial sector of the US economy, the model captures the key variables of it: 
the lending rate, rg, ,  the deposit rate, r ^ ,  and the default rate, 1 — q. These are the 
main parameters calibrated. The values of the rest of the parameters are standard 
in the literature. To capture the dynamics of the economy over the business cycle 
the model is calibrated at a quarterly frequency.
2.4.1 Fixed parameters
The values of the fixed parameters are presented in Table (2.1). The output to 
capital ratio, Y / K ,  is obtained from the Penn World tables (PWT). The depreciation 
rate of capital , 5, is 0.01.
According to the model, the labor income in the FGP sector to GDP is
wcNc
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This is different from the labor share usually estimated in the literature because it 
does not contain the labor income from the financial sector. To obtain an appropriate 
measure of the labor share, the standard labor share is rescaled by the share of labor 
in the non-financial industry,
Estimates of the labour share in GDP, a*, are obtained from Caselli (2007). The 
share of labor in the non-financial sector is obtained from the International Labor 
Organisation.
The values of the parameters of the technology process and the investment shock are 
standard in the literature (Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), Del Negro, Schorfheide, 
Smets and Wouters (2007) and Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2008)).
Following Elizalde and Repullo (2007), the value for the amount of resources that 
financial intermediaries recover in case the investment project fails, t , is equal to 
0.452. This is the value specified in the IRB foundation approach of Basel II for senior 
claims on corporates, sovereigns and banks not secured by recognized collateral.
The value chosen for the weights of labor supply in each sector in the labor index, x, 
is such that the fraction of labor in the financial sector is equal to 10%, the average 
value for the last 15 years. Finally, following standard practice in the literature, the 
Frisch elasticity is equal to 1.
2.4.2 Calibrated parameters
The following 6 parameters are calibrated: the discount factor, /?, the return on 
investment, 7 7 ,  the fraction of type H  projects, p, the return of capital, r # ,  and the 
financial technology, A. The first 3 parameters are chosen so that the model matches
2This value is very close to the estimated average loss given default by Djankov, Hart, McLiesh, 
and Shleifer (2006) for the US.
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the following 3 moments: the average real interest rate of deposits, rD, the average 
real interest rate of lending, r^ , and the average default rate of lending, 1 — q.
The calibration of the endogenous parameters proceeds as follows. The discount 
factor is chosen such that the deposit interest rate is equal to the average real 
deposit interest rate for the last ten years at a quarterly frequency.
The deposit interest rate is obtained from the IMF International Financial Statistics 
database and is deflated using the CPI. The value for the return of capital is obtained 
combining the two Euler equations,(2.14) and (2.15),
rK = rD - {  1 -  6)
The lending rate is determined using the first order condition of the FGP optimisa­
tion problem with respect to capital,
g r / ( 1 - a) pa £
rB = ------------------—
rK
The value of the fraction of type L  investment projects accepted, 1 — q, is equal to 
the average net charge off rate of C&I loans of the last 2 decades, which is 0.15%. 
Then, the value chosen for the return of investment, 7 7 ,  is such that the value of 
the lending rate is equal to the average real reference rate for commercial loans (the 
prime rate) for the last 2 decades.
The value chosen for the fraction of type H  investment projects in the economy, p, 
is such that the fraction of type L investment projects accepted, 1 — 0 , is equal to 
the average charge off rate described above. To obtain q as a function of p some 
algebra is needed. First, the definition of </>, equation (2.4), is rewritten as,
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A f = l o g ^  (2.20)
Then, the financial technology parameter, A, the labor in the financial sector to 
investment ratio, and the accuracy of the information produced by loan afficers, 
</>, are substituted for functions of q and p. The labor in the financial sector to 
investment ratio is obtained using the definition of lending, equation (2.6), and the 
first order condition w.r.t. / ,  equation (2.11),
(2 .21)
I  A(1 -<j>)pIM + I C  
N f ~  9 N I M
where, IM,  is the potential interest margin,
I M  = p(rB -  rD)
IC  is the potential interest cost,
I C  =  (1 - p ) ( r D -  t ) 
and N I M  is the net interest margin,
N I M  - qrB +  (1 -  q)r -  rD
The accuracy of the information produced by loan officers, 0, is obtained rewriting 
the definition of the default rate, equation (2.7), as,
0 =  (2.22)
9(1 - p )  +  (i -  q)p
and the function for the financial technology parameter is obtained from the first 
order condition with respect t o n / ,
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A (1 -  <j>)p(IM + IC)  (2'23^
2.4.3 Calibration of the one sector Real Business Cycle m odel
The calibration of the one sector model provides a benchmark where the IR functions 
of the general model can be compared. This facilitates the understanding of the effect 
of financial intermediaries credit policies. Therefore, the values of the fundamental 
parameters of the one sector economy are equal to those of the general model, except 
for the financial technology. These parameters are summarised in table (2.3), and 
include the depreciation rate, S: the return of investment projects, 7 7 ,  the parameters 
of the technology shock and the investment specific shock, and the output to capital 
ratio. The two endogenous parameters are the return of capital and the return from 
savings. The first is obtained from the first order condition from FGP,
Y
rK{rK + 1 - 6 )  = 77(1 -  a)ga—
The return from savings is obtained combining the two Euler equations from the 
consumers problem, as in the general model,
t d  = r K  + 1 -  6
2.5 R esu lts
In this section, the main features of the model are discussed by analysing the effects 
of a technology shock and an investment specific shock. There is a vast literature 
studying which are the main shocks driving business cycles fluctuations. The de­
bate is mainly centered on the relative importance between technology shocks and 
investment specific shocks (see King and Rebelo (1999), Gali and Rabanal (2005)
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Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Vigfusson (2004) and Fisher (2006)), even if recent 
evidence suggests that investment specific shocks may have had a more prominent 
role during the last two decades (Justiniano, Primiceri and Tambalotti (2008)). Be 
as it may, these two shocks explain most of the business cycle variation of the main 
aggregate variables, especially output, investment, hours and capital, which are the 
focus of this paper.
The impulse response functions of the main variables are presented first to under­
stand the mechanics of the model. The ability of the model to replicate the pattern 
of the credit standards over the business cycle is checked by analyzing the cross 
correlations of the simulated model. Finally, an assessment of the impact of credit 
standards policies in terms of economic volatility is studied from the standard de­
viations of the simulated model. The model’s dynamics are obtained by taking a 
log-linear approximation around the steady state.
2.5.1 Impulse Response functions
Figure (2.1) reports the impulse responses to the investment specific shock. To better 
understand their effects upon economic performance, the impulse response functions 
of the general model with two sectors are plotted together with the impulse response 
functions of the one sector model. In both models, output, hours and investment 
rise persistently following a positive impulse, as is customary in the literature. The 
response of investment is quite similar between the two economies, but the speed at 
which they accumulate capital is different, as well as the quantitative response of 
output. This is due to the rise in the default rate. With the increase in the return 
of investment, the optimal policy of financial intermediaries is to increase their 
lending even if it comes at the cost of funding a greater amount of bad investment 
projects. This is compensated by the increase in the interest margin. The increase 
in the default rate reduces significantly the speed at which the economy accumulates 
capital.
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It is important to note that the fact that the default rate is positive in the general 
model at the steady state reduces its efficiency to transform investment into capital. 
This increases the optimal investment to capital ratio with respect to the one sector 
model. However, in net terms, both economies accumulate capital at the same speed 
in the steady state. Therefore, the difference in the accumulation of capital is only 
due to the lower response of investment and the higher default rate.
The increase in the default rate affects output through another channel: the lower 
efficiency of investment reduces the return from capital, and hence, the return from 
savings. This reduces the wealth effect that agents experience from the positive 
shock, and they reduce the labor supply, which reduces output even further.
The impulse responses of a neutral technology shock are presented in Figure (2.2). 
As expected output and capital increase following a positive impulse. The shock 
produces an important wealth effect to the agents, and this reduces substantially 
the response of hours and investment, which now move very mildly after the shock. 
The technology shock does not have such a positive and persistent effect on the 
return of capital. Then, financial intermediaries cannot expect to compensate a 
worsening of the loan portfolio with an increase of the interest margin. This forces 
them to maintain the quality of the loan portfolio. Since the reaction of the default 
rate is more modest, the difference between the impulse response functions of the 
models for the rest of the variables is much lower. However, it is worth stressing 
that the response of hours to a technology shock is negative in the general model. 
As noted in Gali and Rabanal (2005) this is one of the main failures of the RBC 
literature, which predicts a positive comovement between output and hours, while 
they document empirically that hours decline after a positive technology shock. The 
impulse response functions of the general model point to the financial intermediaries 
as potential candidates to explain the empirical results obtained by Gali and Rabanal 
(2005).
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2.5.2 M om ents from the simulated m odel
This section analyses more accurately the magnitude of the fluctuations of each 
variable and the relation between them. The average moments are obtained from 200 
simulations of the linearized model of 500 quarters each. The average correlations 
and the average standard deviations are computed after detrending all the variables 
using the Hodrick-Prescott filter. As in the previous section, the moments of the 
variables from the general model are compared to those of the one sector model.
To have a better assessment of the performance of the models, the moments are also 
compared with the moments of the real data. These are obtained using quarterly 
U.S. data for the period 1985:I-2007:IV. The series for output correspond to non­
farm business-sector output, labor input series is hours of all persons in the nonfarm 
business sector. Both series are expressed in per-capita terms, using a measure of 
civilian noninstitutional population aged 16 and over. The series for the interest 
margin are obtained after taking the difference between the reference rate for com­
mercial loans (the prime rate) and the CD rate3. The stock of Commercial and 
Industrial loans outstanding is used to construct the series for the new loans made 
each quarter assuming an average maturity of the loan portfolio equal to 4 years, 
as in Van den Heuvel (2002). Finally, the series of the default rate correspond to 
the charge off rate of Commercial and Industrial loans. To obtain a comparable 
set of moments to those generated from the model, all series are logged and then 
detrended.
Correlations
The average correlations obtained from the model with the investment shock are 
presented in Figure (2.4). As it could be expected from the impulse response func­
tions, both models are able to capture the positive correlation between output and 
lending that is observed in the data. The same happens with hours. The observed 
contemporaneous correlation between the default rate and output is negative. Ex­
3 Using the federal funds rate delivers very similar results.
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pansionary investment shocks incite loan officers to reduce their lending standards 
and to accept loans with a higher expected default rate. Since the model only has 
one period loans, the contemporaneous correlation between output and the default 
rate is also positive. However, as many authors have noted, bad loans do not default 
immediately (Berger and Udell (2004), Jimenez and Saurina (2006), Mian and Sufi
(2007), Dell’Ariccia, Igan and Laeven (2008)). These papers draw a causal rela­
tionship between decreases in lending standards and increases of the default rate in 
future periods. Then, the correlation between output and the default rate obtained 
from the model should be compared with the correlation of output and the default 
rate in future periods. Figure (2.5) illustrates that future values of the default rate 
are positively and strongly correlated with current values of the GDP. The general 
model also matches the positive correlation between the interest margin and the 
default rate.
The average correlations obtained from simulating the model with the technology 
shock are presented in Figure (2.5). Again, both models replicate the procyclical 
behavior of lending and hours observed in the data. The same cannot be said for 
the default rate and the interest margin. Their correlations are now much lower. 
This is not surprising since the impulse response functions already showed that the 
low response of the return of capital was limiting the increase in the default rate 
and the lending rate.
Standard Deviations
The average standard deviations are presented in Figures (2.6) and (2.7) for the 
model with the investment shock and the model with the technology shock respec­
tively. In general, the volatility generated by the one sector model is higher than 
the one generated by the general model. This is because financial intermediaries 
reduce the effect of shocks to the economy. The volatility of output produced by the 
investment shock in the general model is similar to the one observed in the data, 
while the volatility generated by the one sector model is higher. The general model 
explains about 25% of the variation of the default rate and about 90% of the interest
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margin volatility. Regarding hours and lending, the standard deviations generated 
by both models are higher than the ones observed.
The fact that the volatility of output generated by the general model is lower than 
the volatility of the RBC model might look at odds with the financial accelerator 
literature, which claims that the financial sector amplifies business cycle fluctuations. 
However, it is worth noting that the model is based on one period loans and that 
the default rate is realized at the end of the credit contract. Just adding time delays 
to the repayment of loans would certainly produce a negative contemporaneous 
correlation of output and the default rate, which would soar when the positive 
effects of the shock would be gone. The interaction of the dynamics presented 
with other amplification mechanisms, the myopia of loan officers as suggested by 
Rajan (1994) or the collateral effects suggested by Kiyotaki and Moore (1997) could 
result into further amplification of shocks. This is left for further research, but both 
mechanisms should be seen as complementary.
Concerning the technology shock, both models produce similar standard deviations 
of output, but the volatility of the rest of the variables decreases substantially. This 
is specially the case for the default rate and the interest margin, for which it only 
generates a 2% and 3% of the observed volatility respectively.
2.6 R obu stness checks
2.6.1 The effect o f labor market rigidities
The parameter l measures the degree of labor market rigidities. It captures the speed 
at which the labor force can be reallocated across sectors. If i =  0, labor can be 
reallocated across sectors freely. Greater values of it reduce the speed of adjustment 
of the labor market. Iacoviello and Neri (2008) estimate a value of l =  1 for the US, 
in a model with a sector that produces durable goods and a sector that produces 
non-durable goods. This is the value that has been used for the calibration. The
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absence of a direct estimate of the labor rigidities in the financial sector obliges us to 
check their effect for the transmission mechanism of shocks. It is worth noting that 
Berger and Udell (2004) argue that the strong reliance of financial intermediaries in 
human capital makes this sector especially sluggish when it has to adjust the labor 
force after a negative shock. The difficulty of financial intermediaries to hire and 
train loan officers reduces their capacity to appropriately screen loan applications, 
which translates into an increase of the default rate.
Therefore, this section analyses how the impulse response functions and the moments 
from the simulated model change when the degree of labor market rigidities changes. 
Two alternative economies are considered: one with a more flexible labor market, 
with l — 0.5, and another one with a more rigid labor market, with i =  2.
The impulse response functions of an investment specific shock and a neutral tech­
nology shock are presented in Figures (2.3) and (2.4), respectively. The first thing to 
notice is that the main results presented above do not change substantially. For the 
neutral technology shock, the impulse response functions are very similar to those 
presented in the benchmark calibration, both quantitatively and qualitatively. This 
could be expected since the shock has a minor effect on the credit standard policies.
For the investment specific shock, the qualitative results do not change, but quanti­
tatively they vary slightly. The argument is similar to the one presented by Berger 
and Udell (2004): labor market rigidities reduce the capacity of financial interme­
diaries to adjust to the shock. This increases the effect of the shock on the default 
rate and hence, it worsens the performance of the rest of the economy.
This results are confirmed by the moments from the simulation of the model. The 
variation of the correlations between the variables remains very similar to those 
obtained with the benchmark calibration. The standard deviations for the model 
with a technology shock also remain fairly constant. This is not the case for the 
investment shock. With a more rigid labor market the volatility of lending generated 
by the model decreases and becomes very close to the one observed in the data, while
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the standard deviation of the default rate increases substantially. The standard 
deviation of output and interest margin generated by the model are still very similar 
to those observed in the data, while the volatility of hours is still too large.
Overall, investment shocks seem to be a better candidate than technology shocks to 
explain the behavior of bank lending policies.
2.6.2 Sensitivity of the results to  the Frisch Elasticity
The parameter ip measures the elasticity of the labor supply with respect to income. 
Given that the literature has not yet reached a consensus on its value, and the 
importance it may have for the dynamics generated by the model, this section checks 
the effect of using two extreme values, = 0.5 and <p — 2. The results are presented 
in columns "low Frisch" and "high Frisch" of tables (2.4), (2.5), (2.6) and (2.7). 
The qualitative results are maintained unaltered for both shocks. Quantitatively, 
the main changes occur for the investment shock. As expected, a greater value of 
the Frish elasticity reduces the variation of hours, which get closer to the observed 
standard deviation. The same happens for investment and output. The effect on 
the variation of the interest margin and the default rate is milder. The general 
model continues to match the variation of the interest margin and it still produces 
a significant variation in the default rate.
2.7 C oncluding R em arks
The current global financial turmoil has shown, once again, how vulnerable economies 
are to the lending policies taken by financial intermediaries. It has also highlighted 
the lack of tools that economists in general, and monetary authorities in particular, 
have to analyze the financial sector. The reason: most of the macroeconomic models 
employed to analyze the effects of the financial sector define it as a clearing sector 
between the demand and the supply of lending. All the variation arises from changes
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of the borrowing capacity of agents, not from the financial sector itself. This is a 
crucial drawback to understand the effects of the existing financial regulation, or 
the effects of monetary policy. This paper takes a step in this direction by model­
ing explicitly the financial sector as a productive industry, as in Ruckes (2004) and 
Hauswald and Marquez (2003), in which loan officers decide the amount of lending 
as well as the risk of the loan portfolio. But in this paper the financial sector is 
integrated into a dynamic general equilibrium model. The mechanics of the model, 
the ability to replicate the actual policies taken by financial intermediaries and their 
economic impact are studied from the impulse response functions to an investment 
shock and a technology shock, and from the moments of the simulated model.
Investment shocks appear as a good candidate to explain the variation in bank 
lending policies since they are able to generate a counter-cyclical pattern of credit 
standards. Their effect on the return from capital incites loan officers to expand their 
lending even if it comes at the cost of a higher default rate. This is compensated 
by an increase in the interest margin. The increase in the default rate reduces 
considerably the positive effects of the shock. It reduces the efficiency with which 
the economy accumulates capital. And it also reduces the return from savings, which 
in turn reduces the positive wealth effect from the shock and hence, the supply of 
labor.
Despite being a very stylized model (there are no nominal frictions and there is no 
role for the collateral channel), the investment shock is able to match fairly well the 
standard deviation of output, lending and the interest margin, and it generates a 
30% of the observed volatility in the default rate. Thus, this model can be useful 
to analyze the effects of monetary policy and financial regulation on bank lending 
policies, two areas were further research is needed.
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2. A  A p p en d ix  
2.A.1 Tables
Param eter Sym bol Value
Depreciation rate (5 0.01
Labor share in the FGP sector a 0.63
Output to capital ratio YK 0.45
Growth rate of technology 'tPa 0.0044
St. Dev. of the technology shock < 0.89
Persistence of the investment shock i 11 0.83
St. Dev. of the investment shock 6.01
Recovery given default T 0.45
Frisch elasticity V 1
Labor market weights X 0.1
Table 2.1: Values of the fixed parameters
Param eter Sym bol Value
Default rate 1 - q 0.0015
Lending rate r B 0.01
Deposit rate td 0.005
Discount rate P 0.99
Financial technology X 25.2
Return of investment r i 0.0958
Fraction of type H  investment projects p 0.72
Table 2.2: Values of the calibrated parameters
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Param eter Sym bol Value
Depreciation rate 8 0.01
Output to capital ratio YK 0.45
Deposit rate td 1.005
Discount rate (3 0.99
Retrun of capital Tk 0.0151
Labor share in the FGP sector a 0.63
Output to capital ratio YK 0.45
Growth rate of technology 0.0044
St. Dev. of the technology shock 0.89
Persistence of the investment shock $1 0.83
St. Dev. of the investment shock 6.01
Table 2.3: Parameters of the One Sector Model
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Correlations o f the variables
Data
Average Correlations of the model with an investment shock
General model One Sector model
Benchmark Flexible Tight Low Frisch High Frisch Benchmark Low Frisch High Frisch
L,Y 0.56 0.97 0.97 0.96 0.98 0.92 0.99 0.99 0.98
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N,Y 0.77 0.96 0.97 0.95 0.98 0.92 0.99 0.99 0.97
(0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
PD,Y -0.45 0.98 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.93
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01)
PD,IM 0.32 1.00 0.99 1.00 1.00 1.00
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Table 2.4: Average correlations from 200 simulations of 500 quarters each. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. L stands for 
lending, Y for Output, N for total hours, PD for the default rate and IM for the interest margin. The Benchmark colum presents 
the results using the benchmark calibration of each model. The Flexible colum presents the results using a lower value of the degree 
of rigidities in the labor market, and the Tight one does the opposite. The Low Frisch colum presents the results using a lower value 
of the Frisch elasticity, while the High Frisch does the opposite.
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Correlations o f the variables
Data
Average Correlations of the model with a technology shock
General model One Sector model
Benchmark Flexible Tight Low Frisch High Frisch Benchmark Low Frisch High Frisch
L,Y 0.56 0.85 0.84 0.86 0.85 0.85 0.99 0.99 0.99
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
N,Y 0.77 0.64 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.96 0.96 0.96
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
PD,Y -0.45 0.01 -0.16 0.24 -0.03 0.04
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02)
PD,IM 0.32 0.99 0.99 0.96 0.99 0.99
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Table 2.5: Average correlations from 200 simulations of 500 quarters each. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. L stands for 
lending, Y for Output, N for total hours, PD for the default rate and IM for the interest margin. The Benchmark colum presents 
the results using the benchmark calibration of each model. The Flexible colum presents the results using a lower value of the degree 
of rigidities in the labor market, and the Tight one does the opposite. The Low Frisch colum presents the results using a lower value 
of the Frisch elasticity, while the High Frisch does the opposite.
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Standard D eviations o f the m ain m acro-econom ic variables
Average Standard Deviations from the model with an investment shock
General model One Sector model
Data Benchmark Flexible Tight Low Frisch High Frisch Benchmark Low Frisch High Frisch
Y 0.82 1.14 1.62 0.79 1.66 0.72 2.79 4.37 1.64
(0.06) (0.09) (0.05) (0.10) (0.04) (0.16) (0.23) (0.11)
L 7.86 13.79 19.67 9.48 15.52 12.40 20.14 24.72 16.81
(0.65) (1.00) (0.55) (0.87) (0.69) (1.13) (1.32) (1.06)
N 1.15 3.01 3.03 3.39 3.92 2.25 4.33 6.78 2.53
(0.14) (0.15) (0.20) (0.22) (0.13) (0.24) (0.36) (0.16)
PD 35.60 8.52 5.61 10.82 9.07 8.10
(0.40) (0.29) (0.63) (0.51) (0.45)
IM 9.27 8.21 6.15 9.86 8.63 7.90
(0.38) (0.31) (0.58) (0.48) (0.44)
Table 2.6: Average standard deviations from 200 simulations of 500 quarters each. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. L stands 
for lending, Y for Output, N for total hours, PD for the default rate and IM for the interest margin. The Benchmark colum presents 
the results using the benchmark calibration of each model. The Flexible colum presents the results using a lower value of the degree 
of rigidities in the labor market, and the Tight one does the opposite. The Low Frisch colum presents the results using a lower value 
of the Frisch elasticity, while the High Frisch does the opposite.
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Average Standard Deviations of the model with a technology shock
General model One Sector model
Data Benchmark Flexible Tight Low Frisch High Frisch Benchmark Low Frisch High Frisch
Y 0.82 0.96 0.97 0.95 1.00 0.94 0.92 1.04 0.93
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06)
L 7.86 2.21 2.52 1.97 2.40 2.08 1.62 1.86 1.60
(0.14) (0.15) (0.12) (0.14) (0.13) (0.18) (0.13) (0.11)
N 1.15 0.29 0.28 0.31 0.39 0.20 0.18 0.28 0.11
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
PD 35.60 0.64 0.85 0.50 0.56 0.71
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
IM 9.27 0.27 0.36 0.25 0.24 0.30
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Table 2.7: Average standard deviations from 200 simulations of 500 quarters each. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. L stands 
for lending, Y for Output, N for total hours, PD for the default rate and IM for the interest margin. The Benchmark colum presents 
the results using the benchmark calibration of each model. The Flexible colum presents the results using a lower value of the degree 
of rigidities in the labor market, and the Tight one does the opposite. The Low Frisch colum presents the results using a lower value 
of the Frisch elasticity, while the High Frisch does the opposite.
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Figure 2.1: Impulse Response functions for a positive investment shock. General 
Model vs. One Sector Model.
O. Aspachs-Bracons 89 Chapter 2
Credit Standards Cycles
r Technology Shock■General Model One sector model
10 15
Hours
20
10 15
Defaiit rate
20
25
- 0  2 ,
25
Output
0.6
0 4
Captal
0 6
04
0.2
- 0 .2 ,
Return of Capital
0 4 i
0.2
Interest Margin
15 20 25
0.3j • ■ ** - v-* 11 . • * ■ • ----- i
0.2
0.1 \
nu
-0.1
- x X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X K X X-X - 
-------------1-------------1-------------1------------- 1-------------
10 20 25
Figure 2.2: Impulse Response functions for a positive technology shock. General 
Model vs. One Sector Model.
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Chapter 3
The Effects of Housing Prices and 
M onetary Policy in a Currency 
Union
The recent increase in housing prices has refreshed the debate on 
the drivers of housing cycles as well as the appropriate policy response.
We analyze the case of Spain, where housing prices have soared since 
it joined the EMU. We present evidence based on a VAR model, and 
we calibrate a New Keynesian model of a currency area with durable 
goods. We find that loosing monetary policy autonomy is of first order 
importance to cushion risk premium shocks, while this is not the case 
for housing demand shocks. In addition, labor market rigidities provide 
stronger amplification effects to all type of shocks than financial frictions 
do.
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3.1 In trod u ction
During the last two decades, the economic importance of the housing sector has 
reached unprecedented levels. In most developed countries, housing wealth is above 
100 percent of GDP, as for instance in the US, the UK, or Spain, and it represents the 
bulk of households’ assets. Moreover, residential investment is highly pro-cyclical 
and more volatile than GDP. As a result, the recent boom in housing prices in 
many advanced economies has refreshed the debate on the drivers of housing cycles 
and the role of the housing sector in amplifying economic volatility, as well as the 
appropriate response of the monetary authorities.1
The case of Spain is of special interest since its recent economic expansion has been 
characterised by sustained growth of residential investment, private consumption, 
credit and housing prices for more than a decade. Moreover, during this period 
nominal and real interest rates have fallen to exceptional low levels during the con­
vergence period to enter the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). As a 
result, a growing current account deficit has emerged, reaching almost 10 per cent of 
GDP by 2007. In addition to growing imbalances, a special source of concern for the 
Spanish economy is the loss of monetary policy autonomy after entering the EMU. 
In the UK or the US, the central bank can increase interest rates to slow down the 
growth rate of housing prices, and also respond to a housing price collapse. However, 
Spain belongs to the EMU, and the European Central Bank sets rates according to 
the inflation rate of the Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) of the Euro 
area as a whole.
The recent evolution of the Spanish economy including the housing market is shown 
in Figures (3.1) to (3.5). The large decline of interest rates, with an already booming 
Spanish economy, discouraged households from saving and increased the demand of 
mortgage and consumption credit. The demand for housing was further increased
1A recent paper by Federal Reserve Governor Mishkin (2007) suggests that in response to a 
housing price drop in the United States of 20 percent, the Federal Reserve should cut its interest 
rates between 75 and 175 basis points, depending on the assumptions about the transmission 
mechanism.
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by the high levels of inmigration and the baby boom generation, fuelling residen­
tial investment in particular and economic growth. The increase in the demand for 
housing, in turn, caused house prices to rise, augmenting the wealth and borrowing 
capacity of house owners who could in principle increase their consumption.2 The 
growing current account deficit is the other indicator of the magnitude of the con­
sumption and borrowing boom, since the savings-investment imbalance lead Spanish 
households and firms to obtain financing from abroad.
Hence, in this paper we study the response of an economy such as the Spanish one 
to fluctuations in housing prices and residential investment, where the main tool 
of monetary policy, the nominal interest rate, only reacts to domestic conditions 
as long as they affect aggregate indices of the currency area as a whole. First, we 
present VAR evidence that shows the response of private consumption, residential 
investment, and real house prices to an interest rate shock and to a housing demand 
shock. We show that, as in the US, an increase of interest rates leads to a decline in 
both final consumption and residential investment, a finding labelled as “comove­
ment” in the literature. On the other hand, we find that these two variables move 
in opposite directions following a housing demand shock.
Then, we rationalize our findings by building a two-country, two-sector model of 
a currency union, in the spirit of Benigno (2002) and Rabanal (2007). The model 
includes durable and non-durable goods. The utility derived from the consumption 
of the non-durable goods is given by its flow, while the utility derived from the 
consumption of the durables is given by its stock. As a result, holding durables not 
only provides utility to the consumer but also provides a wealth effect due to its 
reselling value. In addition, the international dimension of the model implies that 
the savings and investment balance need not hold period per period at the country 
level. This will allow us to explain how increased credit demand in one country of 
a currency union can be met through funds coming elsewhere in the union without
2However, we should note that estimates of the marginal propensity to consume out of housing 
wealth in Spain are lower than in other countries. Bover (2007) obtains estimates of about 0.01- 
0 .02 .
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raising the domestic interest rate. We calibrate the model, and examine the reaction 
of domestic variables and the nominal interest rate to a monetary policy shock, a risk 
premium shock and a demand/preference shock in the durable sector. We find that 
shocks that hit Spain and the rest of countries in the currency area symmetrically, 
such as the monetary policy shock, produce smaller fluctuations than those that are 
country-specific, such as a risk premium or housing demand shocks. A negative risk 
premium shock generates larger fluctuations in output than the monetary policy 
shock, and also leads to a large and persistent deterioration of the net foreign asset 
position of Spain. The demand shock also ends up generating significant fluctuations 
on the non-durables sector and in the final output, since the interest rates are set 
according to Euro Area conditions and do not react importantly to country-specific 
shocks. Overall, we find that both the demand shock and the risk premium shock 
produce effects on the main aggregates of the economy similar to the ones observed 
in the data and in the VAR.
An additional source of concern are the accelerator effects that fluctuations in the 
housing sector might create. The nominal (and real) growth of the housing sector 
has increased the amount of collateral available, allowing households to borrow more 
(or to save less in other instruments) and hence stimulating private consumption. 
While this amplification effect during the booming side of the cycle may be wel­
come, the potential effects during a downturn are one of the main worries of many 
policymakers and households, especially if the effects are asymmetric and stronger 
during recessions.3 There is a well established literature that highlights the role of 
collateral as a key element in the transmission mechanism of shocks and captures 
how economic cycle swings are amplified through the financial sector (Kiyotaki and 
Moore (1997) and Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist (1999)). More recently, a new 
strand of the literature has focused on the role that housing in particular plays in the 
transmission mechanism of shocks, confirming its importance (Aoki et. al. (2004), 
Iacoviello (2005), and Monacelli (2006)). We therefore proceed with our analysis
3See, for instance, the latest conference organized by the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City 
in Jackson Hole, Wyoming.
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by studying how the impact of each shock changes when the fraction of credit con­
strained agents increase, and/or their pledging capacity changes. As expected, the 
responses of both non-durable and durable output are substantially larger when 
financial frictions are tighter. But, we find that under financial frictions both con­
sumption and residential investment move in the same direction after a housing 
demand shock, contradicting our VAR evidence.
However, the most important element that arises from the model in determining the 
capacity of the economy to absorb those shocks is the flexibility of its labor market. 
This is key when shocks affect each sector with different intensities, or even with 
different sign. In our model economy this happens for two reasons. First, following 
Bils and Klenow (2004) prices are more flexible in the durables sector than in the 
non-durables sector. Second, the additional value of durables as a saving device 
makes this sector to be especially dependent on interest rate changes. We compare 
the impact of the monetary and housing demand shocks for different degrees of labor 
market frictions and different degrees of financial frictions. Quite surprisingly, and 
as opposed to the existing literature that stresses the role of financial frictions and 
borrowing constraints, we find that the effect of introducing these financial frictions 
is smaller than removing labor market rigidities. However, we find that in order 
to match our VAR-based evidence, a smaller degree of costly labor reallocation is 
needed, compared to the estimates for the US economy by Iacoviello and Neri (2008).
In order to analyse the additional volatility that belonging to the EMU might have 
caused, we compare the impulse response functions of a risk premium and hous­
ing demand shocks in the currency union benchmark case with those of running 
autonomous monetary policy with domestic inflation targeting. Under an inflation 
targeting regime with a pure floating exchange rate, the monetary policy reaction 
to a domestic shock is more aggressive than when belonging to a currency union. 
In addition, we also study the case of running an inflation targeting regime with 
a managed float. Our conclusion is that running an autonomous monetary policy 
allows the domestic economy to better cushion adverse shocks. This is specially
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important in the risk premium shock case since it has first order effects on output 
and inflation.
Our results are then suggestive of what can work and what cannot work when we 
estimate our model with Bayesian methods, which is the next step in the agenda. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 3.2, we present some VAR- 
based evidence. In section 3.3, we present the model, and in section 3.4 we discuss 
at length the quantitative implications of the model, as well as several robustness 
checks. We leave section 3.5 for concluding remarks.
3.2 T he V A R  R esponse to  H ousing D em and  and  
In terest R ate  Shocks
In this section, we present some evidence on the response of main macroeconomic 
variables to housing demand and interest rate shocks with the help of a Vector 
Autoregressive (VAR) model. Several papers in the literature have studied the 
response of durable and non-durable consumption to a monetary policy shock using 
a VAR and the recursive identification scheme of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 
(1999, 2005). This approach consists in identifying the effect of the monetary policy 
shock by using the Cholesky decomposition of the variance-covariance matrix of the 
reduced form residuals of the VAR. Papers following this approach include Erceg 
and Levin (2006) and Monacelli (2006). In addition, we seek to identify a housing 
demand shock from the VAR. We do so by assuming that the housing demand 
shock affects the relative price of housing within a period, but it does not affect its 
quantity: in the short run the supply of housing is fixed, and demand shocks must 
be absorbed via price movements.
We estimate the following VAR using k variables:
L
Yt = C + J 2 A j Yt. j + B ut
3= 1
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where Yt is a kx  1 vector of observable variables, C  is a k x l  vector of constants, 
Aj are kxk  matrices that collect the effect of endogenous variables at lag j  on 
current variables, L is the lag length in the VAR, B  is a kxk  lower triangular matrix 
with diagonal terms equal to unity, and ut is a k x l  vector of zero-mean, serially 
uncorrelated shocks with diagonal variance-covariance matrix.
'  Ylt Rt Y2tThe vector of endogenous variables is divided as follows: Yt =  
where Y\t is a group of macroeconomic variables predetermined when monetary 
policy decisions are taken, R t is a relevant interest rate, and Y2t contains the variables 
affected contemporaneously by monetary policy decisions. As is costumary in the 
literature, to identify the interest rate shock we place the nominal interest rate after 
the macroeconomic variables. We place it before housing prices since we assume 
that they respond to changes in monetary policy within a period: as an asset price, 
housing prices are likely to respond contemporaneously to changes in the nominal 
interest rate. Hence, our housing demand shock is the shock that affects housing 
prices within a period, after taking into account the effect that changes in the interest 
rate have on housing prices.4
The vector of observable variables is divided the following way. In Yu we include: (i) 
household consumption of final goods in Spain, (ii) residential investment in Spain, 
and (iii) the harmonised index of consumer prices (HICP) in the Euro Area. We use 
as a relevant interest rate (R t) the reference 12-month interbank rate.5 We include 
Euro Area inflation in the VAR because nominal interest rates in the euro area 
should react to inflation in the euro area, given the inflation targeting mandate of 
the European Central Bank. Finally, we include in Y2t real house prices in Spain. 
All variables are introduced after taking natural logarithms and first differences, 
except for the nominal interest rate that we introduce directly in levels.
Private consumption and residential investment come from Spanish national ac­
counts data and are deflated by the Spanish GDP deflator. Spain and Euro Area
4 We have also estimated a VAR with the ordering Y t — [ Yu Y2t Rt ] '  and the results are 
very similar to the ones we present.
5 Using the 3-month reference rate delivers very similar results.
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HICP’s come from Eurostat. Nominal housing price series come from the Spanish 
Ministry of Housing and is deflated by the HICP in Spain. In studies involving 
US data the Federal Funds rate is typically the variable used as an indicator of 
the stance of monetary policy, following the study of Bernanke and Blinder (1992). 
Spain relinquished its monetary policy autonomy when it joined the EMU in Janu­
ary 1st, 1999, and hence a domestic reference rate is no longer available. We choose 
the 12-month interbank rate because it is the reference interest rate for mortgages. 
From 1999 we use the 12-month Euribor rate, and before the EMU period we use 
the 12-month MIBOR rate. Note that because of this reason, we call our shock an 
interest rate shock rather than a monetary policy shock in the VAR. We must note, 
however, that the reference rate set by the European Central Bank, the 3-month 
interbank rate and the 12-month interbank rate move very closely together, such 
that changes in the 12-month rate reflect mostly policy actions taken by the ECB. 
We estimate the VAR from 1995:01 to 2007:03 at a quarterly frequency, with 4 lags. 
We are constrained by the availability of the housing price series.
In Figures (3.6) and (3.7) we present the impulse responses of interest rates and 
housing prices to an increase of interest rates and a housing demand shock, and the 
accumulated responses of the other variables with 90 percent confident bands.6 The 
impulse responses are qualitatively similar to those shown by Monacelli (2006) for the 
US economy. The interest rate shock imples an increase of about 25 basis points in 
the nominal interest rate. The cumulative response of residential investment is about 
5 times stronger than that of private consumption, and the effect is also faster. Also 
note that real house prices decline with an increase in the nominal interest rate. On 
the other hand, a housing demand shock increases real house prices and residential 
investment, and it reduces consumption by a small but significant amount during 
the first period. These are the features that we will ask our model to reproduce.
6 Given our short sample it is difficult to obtain significance at 95 percent levels.
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3.3 T h e M odel
The theoretical framework consists of a general equilibrium two country, two sector 
model in a single currency area. The countries are of size n  and 1 — n, and each of 
them produces two types of goods, durables and non-durables, under monopolistic 
competition and nominal rigidities. Only the non-durable goods are tradable. Pro­
ducers of the final durable good sell its product to domestic households only in each 
country, which allows them to increase their housing stock. For this reason, we use 
the terms “durable good production” and “residential investment” interchangeably 
throughout the paper.
Since our VAR analysis has only focused on the effects of monetary and demand 
shocks on the housing sector and the spillover effects to the macroeconomy, the 
model will only include these shocks, so we leave aside technology shocks in the 
current analysis. Iacoviello and Neri (2008) attribute most of the variation in housing 
prices to a housing preference shock. In what follows, we present the home country 
block of the model. The analogous foreign-country variables will be denoted by an 
asterisk.
3.3.1 Households
Each household j  in the home country maximizes the following utility function:
t=0
7 l°g(Ct) + (1 -  7)£« log(-Dt) -  —(U)
l+lp'
(3.1)
where C{ denotes consumption of non-durable goods, and D3t denotes consumption 
of durable goods. In addition, consumption of non-durables is an index composed 
of home and foreign consumption goods:
C l  =  Tr (1 _ T)l-r (C k t Y  ( 4 , )
1  —  T (3.2)
O. Aspachs-Bracons and P. Rabanal 107 Chapter 3
The Effects of Housing Prices and Monetary Policy in a Currency Union
where CJHt and CJFt are, respectively, consumption of the home non-durable goods 
and consumption of foreign non-durable goods by the home agent, and r  is the 
fraction of domestically produced non-durables at home. £t is a housing preference 
shock that follows an AR(1) in logs. Finally, following Iacoviello and Neri (2006), 
we assume that there is imperfect substitutability of labor supply across sectors, 
such that the labor disutility index can be written as:
H  = a - "  ( L p ) 1+‘ + ( l - a ) - ‘ ( i f J) 1+‘ , where i > 0 (3.3)
where Llt'3 denotes hours worked by household j  in each sector i = C ,D , and a  is 
the economic size of each sector. This imperfect substitutability implies tha t there 
is a costly labor reallocation across sectors following a shock. The budget constraint 
of the home agent, in nominal terms, is given by:
Ptc C{ + P °  [D{ -  (1 -  8)Di_,} + B ’t <  R t- y B l ,  +  Wtc L?'j + WtDL ?J +  II? (3.4)
where Ptc and PtD are the price indices of durable and non-durable goods, to be 
defined below, W} is the nominal wage in each sector i = C ,D , and B 3t denotes 
uncontingent nominal assets that are traded among households across the monetary 
union, and that pays (or costs) a gross nominal interest rate Rt > 1. Il3t denotes 
nominal profits, because firms are ultimately owned by households.
We assume that households in the home country have to pay a premium above the 
union-wide riskless nominal interest rate if the country’s debt level as percent of 
GDP increases. This assumption is useful to obtain a well-defined steady state for 
the aggregate level of debt as percent of nominal GDP.7 The relevant interest rate 
for the home households and the union-wide interest axe related as follows:
R t = R t -  fit exp , I  B t B$ -  1 (3.5)PtY, P Y
where Pt is the aggregate price level, to be defined below, and Yt is real GDP, also to
7 See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2003).
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be defined below. This risk premium depends on aggregate variables, such that each 
household takes this effect as given when choosing between consuming durables, non­
durables, and saving. is a risk premium shock that affects the domestic interest 
rate but not the union-wide nominal interest rate. Note that the risk premium is 
declining in the net foreign asset position of the country as percent of GDP,
We can separate the household’s decision as a two stage process. First, households 
choose the amount of labor to supply to each sector, and the consumption of durables 
and non-durables. Second, they allocate how much to spend in home and foreign 
produced goods, taking into account that P fC t =  Ph jChj +  PfjCf j- Note that 
prices of foreign non-durable consumption goods do not carry an asterisk because 
they are also set in euros, and there is no price discrimination across countries.
The first order conditions to the household problem are given by:8
PtD 1 - 7 ZtCt , or, (  Ct PtD+l+ 0(1 -  6)Et (3.6)
P?  7 A
Note that if the durable good was in fact non-durable (i.e. (5 =  1), this condition 
simply states that the marginal utilities of consumption should equal relative prices. 
Since the durable good has a residual value the following period, this induces the 
extra-term of holding an additional unit of the durable good.
A standard Euler equation for the consumption of non-durable goods is:
7 )  ( 3 J |
The labor supply conditions to both sectors are given by:
( L f ) L =  (3.8)
'v W D
(3-9)
8Since all households behave the same way, we drop the j  subscripts in what follows.
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The allocation of expenditures between home and foreign-produced goods is:
c *' = T( l | r )  C t (3'10)
C F,t = (1 -  T)  ( ^ j  l C t . (3.11)
The price index for non-durables is given by
p ,f  =  P TH,tp l 7  (3.1.2)
and the CPI is
pt = ( p ? y  ( p ? ) 1' 1 (3.13)
The utility maximization problem of foreign country households is quite similar. We 
assume that the functional forms for preferences are the same across countries, but 
allow for different parameter values. That is, 7 * is the weight of non-durables in the 
utility function, and r* the fraction of domestically produced non-durables.
3.3.2 Producers
There is a continuum of intermediate goods producers, indexed by h G [0, n] in 
the home country, and by /  G [n, 1] in the foreign country, that are imperfect 
substitutes of each other, and that supply final goods producers in each sector. 
There is a continuum of final goods producers in the two sectors that operate under 
perfect competition and flexible prices. Producers of the final durable good sell 
its product to domestic households only in each country. Producers of the final 
non-durable good sell their product to domestic and foreign households. Hence, it is 
important to distinguish the price level of domestic non-durable consumption goods, 
Pn,ti which does not coincide with the price level of non-durables ( Pf )  because of 
the presence of imported non-durable goods, whose price is Ppjt.
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Final G oods Producers
In the durable sector, final goods producers purchase intermediate goods producers 
and aggregate them according to the following production function:
i f  I YtD(h)~°D~ dh (3.14)
Profit maximization delivers the following demand for individual intermediate non­
durable goods:
(3.15)
where the price level is given by imposing the zero-profit condition.
p P = - ! - -aDdh
In the non-durable goods sector, expressions are similar but with an appropiate 
change of notation since the price level of domestic non-durables and of a basket of 
durables is not the same. The aggregate production function is:
Ytc  = i f  [ Y^ dh (3.16)
individual intermediate non-durable goods demand is:
Ytc (h)
-oc
Y c£ t 5 (3.17)
where the price level is:
; j £ W -a c dh
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Interm ediate G oods Producers
There is a continuum of intermediate goods producers, indexed by h G [0, n\ in the 
home country, and by /  G [n, 1] in the foreign country, that are imperfect substitutes
of each other, and that supply final goods producers in each sector. Intermediate 
goods producers face a Calvo-type restriction when setting their price. In each 
period, a fraction 1 — 0j in each sector receive a signal to reset their price optimally.
Intermediate goods are produced with labor:
In each sector, cost minimization implies that the nominal marginal cost of produc­
tion equals the nominal wage in each sector:
Note that even though labor is the only production input, labor costs may differ 
across sectors because of imperfect labor substitutability. Hence, this effect induces 
an additional channel of heterogeneous inflation responses across sectors, even when 
the parameters governing nominal rigidities are similar across sectors.
Firms in the durable sector face the following maximization problem:
Ytl(h) =  L\{h), for all h G [0, n], and i = C ,D . (3.18)
MC't =  w l, i = C ,D .
oo PtD{h) -  MC°+k- 
PSrk
MaxPp(h)Et OpAtj+k
k=o
subject to future demand
where At,t+k — (3k^ j^  is the stochastic discount factor, and Xt is the marginal utility 
of non-durable consumption.
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The optimal choice is given by:
oo
^ 2  (3k0kDXt+k I j j i
- a D
P t°  °D p  , 
P ? (°n  -  1) '
k= 0 , s = l
t+s ptD+k
1 — cr d
E ^ A w ( l I n f c )  Y&
, , s = l
(3.19)
Given the assumptions about Calvo pricing, the evolution of the price level is:
ptD = { eD {ptD_x)l-°D + (i -  eD) (.PtD) I-1aD ] 1_ (3.20)
Firms in the non-durable sector face a similar maximization problem, and hence the 
optimal price and the evolution of the price level have similar expressions, with the 
appropiate change of notation.
3.3.3 Closing the M odel 
M arket Clearing Conditions
In each intermediate good, supply equals demand. We write the market clearing 
conditions in terms of aggregate quantities. Hence, we multiply per-capita quantities 
by population size of each country. Total production in the non-durable sector is 
equal to total domestic consumption and exports:
Yt°  = nCH,t + ( l - n ) C ^ t 
while residential investment is used to increase the domestic housing stock:
(3.21)
YtD =  n  [A  -  (1 -  5) A - i] (3.22)
For the foreign country, the analogous conditions are:
y; c =  vCFJt +  (1 -  n) CFJt
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Y ;D =  (1 -  n) [Dl -  (1 -  8 )0 1 ,]  (3-24)
Total hours worked equals labor supply in each sector:
p n  p n
/  Lf (h)dh  =  /  L°'j dj (3.25)
Jo  Jo
nn nn
/  Lf{h)dh  =  /  L f ' Uj  (3.26)
J o  Jo
Market clearing in the international bonds market is:
n B t +  (1 -  n)B*t =  0 (3.27)
Finally, the evolution of aggregate net foreign assets is:
nB t = nR t- \B t_i +  (1 -  n) PH,tC*H>t -  nPF>tCF>t (3.28)
M onet ary Policy Rule
In order to close the model, we need to specify a rule for monetary policy, which 
is conducted by the European Central Bank with an interest rate rule that targets 
CPI inflation and also exhibits interest rate inertia:
Rt =
■ _ /  p E M U I p E M U \  T n i
nBMU )
1 - 7  R
R ] - i e x p ( e ^ )  ( 3 . 2 9 )
where the euro area CPI is given by a geometric average of the home and foreign 
country CPIs, using the country size as a weight:
p E M U    p n  ^ p * ^ l —n
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3.4  Q u an tita tive  Im plications o f  th e  M odel
3.4.1 Calibration
In the steady state, we assume zero inflation, that the trade balance is zero, and that 
the net international position of both economies is zero. Therefore, we only need 
to solve for the per-capita values of the home country, which are the same as those 
in the foreign country. We also assume that the degree of monopolistic competition 
in both types of goods is the same (ac = &d =  &), and hence the ratio of prices is 
one. The real interest rate in the currency union is given by the discount factor:
R  =  I  (3.30)
Now, we solve for the levels of consumption of durables, non-durables, debt, total 
hours, and the economic size of each sector. The optimal steady-state ratio of 
durable to non-durable consumption is:
( « >
In a standard model with homogeneous agents and non-durable goods (£ —> 1), the 
optimal steady state ratio of the two types of goods would be equal to the ratio 
of relative weights in the utility function. Because of durability, the ratio is higher 
than otherwise. The fraction of spending allocated to non-durable consumption over 
total spending (a) is equal to:
C — a
C  +  5D
Note that 7  and a  cannot be calibrated independently. Given values for a, 5, (3, we 
can solve for the value of 7  in the utility function. From the pricing equations and 
assuming that the level of monopolistic competition is the same in both sectors, we 
have that:
w c  =  W D =  - — -
O
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As a result, from the optimizing conditions for households,
(1 -  a )L c  =  a L D (3.32)
which means that agents spend a fraction a of time working in the non-durable 
sector, and a fraction 1 — a  in the durable sector. Therefore aggregate production 
levels are given by
Y °  =  anL  (3.33)
Y d =  (1 -  a)nL  (3.34)
Table (3.1) summarises the values of the exogenous and endogenous parameters of 
the model. We set as the home country Spain, and the foreign country the rest of 
the euro area. Hence, we set the size of the home economy to n =  0.1. We set the 
size of the construction sector at 1 — a = 0.1, both in Spain and in the EMU, which 
is roughly the average size for the value added of the construction sector in the last 
decade. We calibrate the bilateral trade parameter (r) based on total imports from 
the EMU to Spain over total spending, and calibrate its analogous parameter in the 
EMU (t *) in a similar way. Finally, we calibrate the debt elasticity parameter to the 
domestic interest rate to a small value of k = 0.001. This value is smaller to the one 
estimated by Rabanal and Tuesta (2007), but captures the idea that interest rates 
spreads between Spain and the EMU have been negligible during this period. We 
calibrate the parameters concerning technology and preferences based on standard 
values in the literature or on the estimates of Iacoviello and Neri (2008) using US 
data, except for the degree of substitutability across labor types, that we set to
t, t* =  0.5, which is in between Iacoviello and Neri (2008) and Monacelli (2006)
. As we explained previosuly, based on all the other structural parameters of the 
economy, we solve for the weight of the housing stock in the utility function.
Having calibrated the real side of the economy, we now proceed to discuss the 
calibration of the degree of nominal rigidity in each sector and country, which is not 
free of controversy. In the literature, there is a long standing debate on the degree
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of nominal rigidities between housing and the other sectors of the economy, and 
how this might affect the transmission mechanism of monetary policy. For instance, 
Carlstrom and Fuerst (2007) use the evidence on frequency of price adjustments in 
the durable and non-durable sectors of Bils and Klenow (2004) to argue that prices 
in the housing sector are more flexible than in the consumption goods sector. Using 
this calibration is problematic because, in the model, a monetary contraction causes 
an expansion of residential investment. This result arises because the different degree 
of nominal rigidity across sectors causes a strong movement of relative prices.
Since we do not have similar survey evidence for the Euro Area and Spain, we 
calibrate the non-durable sector following the estimates of Rabanal (2007) in a 
model with tradable and non-tradable goods. Hence, we set prices to be more sticky 
in the non-durable sector in the euro area (9C =  0.75) than in Spain (6C — 0.5). 
To capture the notion that durable goods (housing prices) might be more flexible, 
we set lower Calvo probabilities in both countries without assuming full flexibility 
(9D = 9d * =  0.25). We conduct a thorough robustness exercise in the following 
section. Finally, we calibrate the parameters of the Taylor rule to estimates obtained 
in the empirical literature in the Euro Area (see, for instance, Rabanal, 2007).
3.4.2 Impulse response functions
In this section, we discuss the main features of the model by presenting the impulse 
response functions of a monetary policy shock, a risk premium shock, and a housing 
preference shock. We obtain the model’s dynamics by taking a log-linear approx­
imation around the steady state. In Appendix A we detail the full set of linear 
equations of the model.
M onetary policy ( e ™)  and risk premium ( f i t )  shocks
In the VAR analysis section, we showed impulse responses to an interest rate shock. 
Without further information, we could not tell if it was a monetary policy shock or
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a movement in market interest rates determined by other factors. However, in the 
context of our model, we can discrimante between monetary policy shocks that affect 
the whole of the euro area, or just Spain. Figure (3.7) presents the impulse response 
functions of the main variables in Spain to an expansionary monetary policy shock 
in the euro area. We choose the size of the shock s™ in the Taylor rule expression 
(3.29) to obtain a decline of 25 basis points on impact in the nominal interest rate. 
Following the shock, consumption of both good types raises, leading to an increase 
of production in both sectors, but it is stronger in the durable sector. We obtain a 
strong comovement between both sectors even though the degrees of nominal rigidity 
are different across sectors. Why is this the case? After a monetary policy easing, 
and as a response to the higher demand, durable good producers can increase the 
price quicker than the non-durable producers and hence, the relative price between 
durables and non-durables increases. This, in turn, reduces the demand of durables 
and it further raises the demand for non-durables. However, the additional value 
that the durable good has as a storage device makes it especially sensible to changes 
in its relative price due to monetary policy shocks and more than offsets the initial 
negative effect. Labor market rigidities also limit de degree of reallocation across 
sectors.
Note also that Spain runs a small trade deficit with the rest of the EMU and hence 
the net foreign asset position becomes negative, but the effect is quantitatively small. 
As a result the euro area interest rate and the interest rate in Spain are numerically 
the same. The small response of the trade balance is due to the fact that the 
shock is symmetric and affects the two countries similarly, given similar production 
structures and preferences. The degrees of nominal rigidity are not so different to 
create quantitatively different responses in Spain and in the rest of the euro area.
Therefore, in Figure (3.8) we inspect the effects of a risk-premium shock in Spain. 
This shock can be justified as a shifting in market sentiment that would imply 
that inverstors are willing to lend to Spain at a lower rate than the euro area. On 
historical grounds, it can also be justified due to the decline in risk premia (less
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exchange rate and inflation uncertainty) and convergence of nominal interest rates 
prior to the introduction of the euro. We assume that the risk premium shock has 
a persistence coefficient of 0.9.
Since this shock also implies a reduction of the relevant nominal interest rate, it is 
also followed by higher levels of all consumption goods in the Spanish economy, with 
a stronger effect on the durable sector. Since Spain’s growth and inflation increase, 
the ECB raises interest rates mildly. Also, since the shock is only expansionary for 
Spain and not the rest of the EMU, a large trade deficit arises, because the increase 
of imports in Spain is not matched by an increase of exports to the euro area, as it 
was the case for the Euro Area-wide monetary policy shock. Therefore, a decline in 
risk premia does fit the Spanish experience fairly well.
H ousing preference shock (£t)
Next, we examine the effects of a housing preference shock. In their study of the 
US economy, Iacoviello and Neri (2008) conclude that these type of shocks explain 
a significant fraction of the volatility of house prices and residential investment. In 
the context of our model, one could see these demand pressures as stemming from 
population changes: increased immigration, the “baby boom” generation that in 
Spain peaked in the 1970s, and changes in social attitudes that reduce the number 
of persons per households.
The housing demand shock is normalized such that residential investment increases 
about 10 percent above its long-run value, and the shock has a persistence coefficient 
of 0.9. The preference shock in the durables sector leads to an increase in the relative 
price of durables. Given the small size of the Spanish economy with respect to the 
Euro area, interest rates barely react to the greater levels of inflation in the Spanish 
economy, allowing it to experience a long lived expansion in this sector together with 
moderate levels of inflation. Note also that non-durable output slightly decreases 
with the housing demand shock, which coincides with the VAR evidence presented 
above. We seek to understand this lack of comovement between the two sectors in
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the following subsection.
T h e effects of belonging to  the EM U
As argued in the introduction, the capacity of the Spanish economy of reacting to 
idiosyncratic shocks was reduced substantially when joining the EMU due to the loss 
of monetary policy autonomy. To analyze the consequences of abandoning monetary 
policy independence, we extend the model of section 3.3 by assuming that both 
countries can run an autonomous monetary policy with different national currencies 
as units of account. We therefore introduce Taylor rules for both countries, an 
uncovered interest rate parity condition, and we assume producer currency pricing 
for imports and exports of non-durable goods, as in Lubik and Schorfheide (2005) 
and Rabanal and Tuesta (2007). The goal is to study how would a small open 
economy react in a two country model when faced with risk premia and housing 
demand shocks.
In log linear terms, the uncovered interest rate parity reads as follows:
rt -  r\ =  Etst+1 - s t -  nbt -  dt (3.35)
where st is the log of the nominal exchange rate, defined as units of home country 
currency per unit of foreign country currency. This equation links the interest rate 
differential to the expected depreciation of the currency, and also includes the en­
dogenous risk premium depending on the net foreign asset position of the economy 
0bt)■
In this case, the domestic interest rate becomes r t , while the foreign interest rate is 
r j, and both follow Taylor rules targeting domestic inflation:
n  =  7 « n -i +  (1 -  7fl)7»Ap( +  (1 -  7B)7sA st (3.36)
< = 7 W -!  +  (1 -  7«)7 .A pt* (3.37)
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Note that we assume that the coefficients of the Taylor rule (7 R and 7 ^) are the same 
across countries. In addition, we consider that the home country can either run a 
pure float, or put some weight on exchange rate depreciation, which is controlled by 
the 7 S parameter. That is, the domestic country (Spain) could either run a purely 
domestic inflation targeting regime (7  ^ =  0), or manage the exchange rate vis-a- 
vis the currency of the rest of the Euro Area by setting 7 S > 0. In the limiting 
case where 7 S —► 00 , the domestic country pegs the exchange rate with the foreign 
country, and the model, would behave exactly like the one we have presented in 
section 3.3.
Finally, since we have assumed that there is producer currency pricing and the law 
of one price holds, durables inflation in both countries is given by:
A p °  = TApHit + ( l - T ) ( A p Ftt + A s t) (3.38)
Apf* =  (1 -  T*)(ApH,t -  Ast) +  T*ApFt (3.39)
such that movements in the nominal exchange rate affect directly the price of imports 
and exports.
In Figures (3.11) and (3.12) we compare the impulse response functions of the risk 
premium and housing demand shocks under three different exchange rate regimes: a 
fixed exchange rate, a pure floating inflation targeting regime and a managed floating 
regime. We use the same calibrations that we discussed in Table (3.1). When we 
refer to the "No EMU Pure float" we set the parameter to 7 S =  0, while in the "No 
EMU Man. float" we set the parameter to 7 S =  1.
The impulse response functions for a risk premium shock are shown in Figure (3.11). 
Under a pure float, a favorable (negative) risk premium shock increases the appetite 
for investment in assets denominated in the home country’s currency, thereby push­
ing interest rates down and causing an appreciation. This worsens the terms of 
trade, implying that the price of exports increases and the price of imports falls, by
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a far larger amount than under the EMU or managed float cases. The fall of interest 
rates causes consumption in both durables and non-durables to expand, while the 
production of durables increases but the production of non-durables decreases due 
to the competitiveness loss. This causes aggregate output to fall as well. A large 
trade deficit emerges under a pure float, which causes the NFA position to worsen 
much more than under a managed float, or belonging to the EMU. Under a man­
aged float regime output increases because the central bank does not allow such an 
appreciation to happen, preventing the deterioration of the termos of trade.
Under a housing demand shock of equal magnitude (Figure (3.12)), the response of 
output is largest in the EMU. The small impact of this shock into the euro area 
economy produces no reaction of the monetary authority, and the Spanish economy 
experiences all the consequences of the shock: high growth in the durable sector, 
almost no effect in the non-durable sector, and moderate levels of inflation. On 
the contrary, in the "No-EMU pure float" case, since monetary policy is set at 
the local level, in response to the demand pressures the central bank increases the 
interest rates, causes an exchange rate appreciation, and output declines in the non­
durable sector. However, inflation pressures are not high enough to force the Spanish 
monetary authoirty to increase the interest rates agressively, and hence the effects 
on total output do not differ much in either case.
Note that, by the same token, if prices where to collapse due to a negative housing 
demand shock, running an autonomus monetary would certainly be more helpful 
to stimulate the economy. However, the differences are quantitatively small. The 
managed float is again an in-between of the two extreme case. At any rate, in all 
cases we are able to explain the lack of comovement, but the intensity is different 
depending on whether we model the small open economy as belonging to a currency 
area or running an autonomous monetary policy.
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3.4.3 Robustness checks 
T he effects o f financial frictions
As it has been widely argued in the literature, the presence of financial frictions 
might amplify the shocks to the economy since the consumption behaviour of credit 
constrained agents is especially dependent on changes of interest rates and durable 
good prices. For instance, Iacoviello and Neri (2008), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006) 
and Monacelli (2006) have suggested that in order to explain a positive comovement 
between the two sectors it is crucial to introduce credit constraints into the model. 
Note, however, that we are able to explain the behavior of Spanish variables with 
a baseline model without credit constraints. One possible reason could be the low 
estimated marginal propensity to consume out of housing wealth in Spain (Bover, 
2007).
To evaluate the importance of financial frictions we analyse how the impact of a 
monetary policy and housing preference shocks varies as the fraction of agents with 
limited borrowing capacity increases, and their pledging capacity changes. We ex­
tend the model of section 3.2 by assuming that a fraction 1 — A of agents face credit 
constraints. In particular, we assume that these agents, which are typically labelled 
as borrowers in the literature (see Monacelli, 2006), are more impatient than the 
regular agents and have a smaller discount factor than the unconstrained agents of 
P < The maximum amount these households can borrow (Si) is linked to their 
repayment capacity based on their housing collateral as follows:
S{ < (1 -  x)Et  ( D{PtD)  (3.40)
where (1 — x) is the loan-to-value ratio. We assume that the financially constraint 
households can borrow from unconstrained households within a country only, and 
that unconstrained households can borrow and lend at the national and international 
levels.
We present the impact effect of monetary and housing demand shocks as a function
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of A and y in Figures (3.13) and (3.14). All other parameter values are set to those 
in Table (3.1). We obtain similar results to those reported in the existing literature, 
in the sense that the response of both non-durables and durables output are substan­
tially larger when financial frictions are tighter. By financial frictions being tighter 
we mean that either there is a larger fraction of credit constrained agents (lower A) 
in the economy and/or their borrowing capacity is more restricted (higher y). After 
a monetary policy shock, non-durable output always increases when financial fric­
tions are present, with the impact effect depending in an important way on A and y. 
The effects on durable output are less dramatic, and they can be nonmonotonic with 
respect to A when the loan-to-value ratio is high (y is low). The consequences of hav­
ing tighter financial frictions on output change critically when the model economy 
experiences a positive housing preference shock. Under our baseline calibration, non­
durable output experiences a small decline after a positive housing demand shock, 
which coincides with the VAR evidence. However, as financial constraints become 
tighter, a positive comovement between durable and non-durable output emerges. 
Hence, we conclude that introducing financial constraints does not help the model 
explain the data. This result is of course Spain-specific, and is somewhat expected 
due to the low marginal propensity to consume out of wealth. It does not mean that 
financial frictions cannot be helpful to explain other countries’ experiences.
The effect o f labor market rigidities
The i parameter in the model measures the degree of labor market rigidity in reallo­
cating the labor force instantaneously across sectors. In the case that i =  0, which 
is the case analyzed by Monacelli (2006), labor can be reallocated across sectors 
freely. On the other hand, Iacoviello and Neri (2008) estimate a value of t =  1. Our 
benchmark calibration is in between, since we pick a value of t =  0.5. Given that the 
shocks that we are analysing imply substantial reallocation of the labor force across 
sectors, we study how the role of these rigidities alters the transmission mechanism. 
The reasons to study the interaction between labor and financial market frictions
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are two: first, we want to capture the importance of the reallocation rigidity across 
sectors that might arise as a result of the growing importance of the non-durable 
sector when the share of credit-constrained agents increases; second, it allows us 
to better grasp the relative importance that each friction plays in the transmission 
mechanism of shocks.
In Figures (3.15) and (3.16) we repeat the same analysis than in Figures (3.13) 
and (3.14) in the (A, l) space, and setting x  — 0.25. These figures show that, for 
both types of shocks, the effect of having a fully flexible labor market on durables 
output is quite remarkable, and it is far more important than any gain from a 
reduction of financial frictions. More concretely, if labor reallocation was costless, 
the response of investment in durable goods under either shock becomes highly 
volatile. On the other hand, the reponse of non-durable output decreases with more 
labor market flexibility under a monetary shock, and it is pretty much unaltered 
under a housing preference shock. Possibly, the fact the latter is 90 percent of 
the economy contributes to its relative stability. Note that our baseline calibration 
allows us to explain a positive comovement of variables under a monetary policy 
shock but a negative comovement under a housing demand shock. Using the value 
suggested by Iacoviello and Neri (2008) of l =  1 delivers a positive comovement 
under either shock contradicting our VAR evidence, while using the costless value 
suggested by Monacelli (2006) delivers too high volatility of durable output. Hence, 
it seems that to explain the evidence in Spain a lower degree of labor market rigidity 
is needed than in the US.
The Role o f N om inal R igidities
The higher price flexibility of the durable sector with respect to the non-durable sec­
tor documented by Bils and Klenow (2004) has tested the capacity of new Keynesian 
models to replicate the observed co-movement between the durable and non-durable 
sectors after a monetary policy shock. As argued by Calstrom and Fuerst (2007) 
and Monacelli (2006), if prices are flexible in one sector but sticky in the other, then
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a monetary policy contraction will imply that output falls in the sticky price sector 
but will increase in the flexible price sector, contradicting VAR evidence using US 
data. These papers suggest that introducing credit constraints and/or labor mar­
ket rigidities might help solve the comovement problem even under heterogeneous 
degrees of nominal rigidity. Hence, we study how the impact of a monetary and 
demand shocks changes for different degrees of price rigidities in the context of our 
model.
In Figures (3.17) and (3.18) we plot how the effect of the model’s shocks changes 
as we change the probability of the Calvo lottery in both sectors. The first result 
to notice is that we do not find a problem of lack of comovement under a monetary 
policy shock: even when one sector is very flexible and the other is not, the response 
of both sectors to a monetary policy shock has the same sign. W hat is behind this 
result is the role of labor market rigidities: since labor reallocation is costly, there 
is no combination of parameters that deliver a “comovement problem” . Actually, 
when we repeat the same exercise as in Figure (3.17) but with i =  0, we do find a 
"comovement problem" for some parameter combinations. On the other hand, we 
do find opposite signs in the response of the two sectors under a housing preference 
shock when the non-durable sector is very sticky and the durable sector is almost 
flexible: in this case, the relative price effect dominates the costly labor reallocation 
effect. Also, the effect of changing the degree of nominal rigidity in the durable sector 
9d is much more important than changing the degree of rigidity in the non-durable 
sector 0C.
Overall, the conclusion to all the robustness exercises is that in the neighborhood 
of our calibration, the most important rigidities are the degree of nominal rigidity 
in the durable sector, and the degree of costly labor reallocation. Financial frictions 
and nominal rigidites play a stronger role in determining the quantitative results, but 
not the qualitative ones. Bayesian estimation of the model, which is the next step 
in our research agenda, will allow us to obtain a better grasp of which parameter 
estimates are necessary to explain, and how they differ from those estimated or
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calibrated for the United States, for instance.
3.5  C oncluding R em arks
In this paper we have reviewed the recent evidence on interest rates, housing prices, 
residential investment and current account deficits in Spain. We have presented some 
evidence based on a VAR model, and then we have rationalized our findings with 
a two-country two-sector model with demand and monetary shocks. In particular, 
we have shown that declining risk premium in the convergence process with the 
partners in the euro area has fueled residential investment and the current account 
deficit. Positive housing demand shocks are also good candidates to explain part of 
the recent housing boom.
We have also examined the costs of losing monetary autonomy by belonging to 
a currency union. We conclude that the behavior of the Spanish economy under 
autonomous monetary policy, or by belonging to the euro area does not differ much 
when the economy faces a housing demand shock. The reason: even if the shock 
has important effects on output, Spanish inflation does not exceed moderate levels, 
and hence an inflation targeting monetary authority remains passive in either case. 
However, the ability to run autonomous monetary policy is important when the 
economy is hit by a risk premium shock. This shock produces first order effects to 
Spanish inflation and output, and the ability to run an independent monetary policy 
is fundamental to cushion them.
We have also examined the key features of the model driving the results. Out of all 
the mechanisms suggested in the literature, labor market rigidities appear to be very 
important to obtain the right comovement between the two sectors of the economy. 
The role of financial frictions are more related with increasing the response of non­
durable goods output to both shocks, but this increase can also be achieved under 
other modelling assumptions.
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3. A  A p p en d ix
3.A .1 Linear approximation
Here we present the loglinear conditions. Also, we define the relative price of
p D  p
durables in terms of non-durables as Qt =  and the terms of trade as Tt = p ^ .  
Also, uj\ denotes deviations from the real wage from steady-state values, defined as 
nominal wage (W() divided by the CPI (Pt), for i = C,D.
Qt = ~ [ 1 — (3(1 — £)] dt +  (3(1 — 8)Et(qt+i — C t + \ )  + (3-41)
qt =  qt~i +  A pf -  Ap f  (3.42)
ct = Etct+i -  (h ~  EtApt+1) (3.43)
ct +  [((p -  l) ol +  i] It +(<P~ 0 (!  -  a )lt = +  (1 -  7 )Qt (3.44)
ct +  [(tp -  0(1 -o i )  + i] It + ( i p -  L)al? = U? +  (1 -  7 )qt (3.45)
The relationship between the two nominal interest rates is as follows:
f t = rt -  Rbt +  tit (3.46)
where bt = (Bt/ Y tPt) denotes the deviation of foreign assets as percent of GDP from 
its steady-state value of zero, and R =  k,(3. In practice we calibrate R instead of k, 
and (3 separately.
The evolution of net foreign assets is:
bt =  i& i-i +  - — ^ — —  (c*H't -  t t) -  (1 -  t )cFit (3.47)
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The evolution of domestic and imported non-durable consumption is
CH,t =  (1 -  r) t t +  Ct 
CF,t =  —T t t  +  Ct
Here we list the evolution of the foreign country variables for households:
q; =  cf -  [1 -  F (1  -  6)] dl +  0(1 -  5)Et (q*t+1 -  c*t+1)
4  =  Et4+i -  <Jt -  EtApZi)
q ;  =  q l 1 +  A  p f - A p f .  
t*)a* + i*] i f '  + [ifi’ -  t*)(l -  =  u f '  +  (1 -  7 *)<£
0 (1  -  a*) +  t*] /?* +  (<?* -  O aV f*  =  +  (1 -  7*k*
Cff.t =  +  c*
cfc, =  - (1  -  r*)ie +  c*
where we have used the definition of the terms of trade, the fact that t t =  
the evolution of the terms of trade is given by:
tt =  t t- i  +  A p f  -  A p f .
The consumer price indices are:
A p t  =  7 A p f  +  (1 -  7  ) A p f  
A p i  =  j ' A p f ’ +  (1 -  7 * ) A p f
(3.48)
(3.49)
(3.50)
(3.51)
(3.52)
(3.53)
(3.54)
(3.55)
(3.56) 
t*, and
(3.57)
(3.58)
(3.59)
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where
Ap f  =  r A p H,t +  (1 -  r ) A p Fj
A P t *  =  (1 -  T * ) A p H,t +  T * A p Fjt 
The production functions are given by:
y?  =  i?
iit =  it
y ?  =  IT  
y? ' =  i ?
And the pricing equations are given by
A P?  -  p c A P t-i =  (3Et {Ap?+l -  ipc A p f ) + kc [w? + (1 -  7 )qt +  (1 -  7
where tP  — ■1 9c^1 Pec) ^VC
A P? ~  P d a P?-i =  f3Et (Ap°+1 -  p DA p f )  +  k d  [w f -  j q t] 
where k d — (1~6>g)(1~^D) ^
v  D
A Pt ~  V c ' A Pt - 1 = &Et ( A p $+ 1 -  p c *A P t )  + k c * u>t’* + (! -  7 * K  ~  (c,*
where k c * = d e c * ) ( l  P&C*)  ^vc*
A P?* ~  Pd*a P?~1 =  P E ^ A p ^  -  p D* A p f )  + kd * u ?'* -  7 *q*t 
where kP* =  (1~6>p*)(1-^ d * ) ^
vc*
The market clearing conditions for the goods sectors read as follows:
c  (1 — n )(l — t *)
yt — TCH,t +  -------- - --------- CH t
(3.60)
(3.61)
(3.62)
(3.63)
(3.64)
(3.65)
)i(] (3.66)
(3.67)
1 -  r*)it
(3.68)
(3.69)
(3.70)
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C* * * , T )  / o  7 - 1  \
Vt = T cF,t +  -i _  „  cF,t ( 3 .7 1 )X IL
dt = (  1 -  8)dt. 1 +  8y? (3.72)
dt =  (1 -  5 K ,!  +  **«?* (3.73)
while for the labor market it is:
I f  =  a l f  +  (1 -  a )f?  (3.74)
=  a *;?* +  ( l  -  Q * ) l f  (3 .7 5 )
To close the model, we specify a monetary policy Taylor rule conducted by the ECB:
n  =  7 « n - i  +  (1 -  y R) ( Ap f MU) + e f  (3.76)
where the euro area CPI is given by
A p f MU = nApt +  (1 -  n)Ap*t (3.77)
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3.A .2 Tables
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters of the Model
n Size of Spain inside the EMU 0.1
a , a* Share of the non-durable sector in the GDP 0.9
1 —  T Fraction of EMU imports consumed in Spain 0.15
1 —  T * Fraction of Spain imports goods consumed in the EMU 0.015
K Debt elasticity of the domestic interest rate 0.001
Elasticity of substitution between intermediate goods 10
(3 Discount factor 0.99
6 Depreciation rate of housing stock 0.025
ip, cp* Labor supply elasticity 0.5
L, i* Substitutability across labour types 0.5
7,7* Share of non-durable consumption in the CPI 0.82
ec Calvo lottery for the non-durable sector in Spain 0.5
eD Calvo lottery for the durable sector in Spain 0.25
ec * Calvo lottery for the non-durable sector in the EMU 0.75
e D* Calvo lottery for the durable sector in the EMU 0.25
Y Inflation parameter of the Taylor rule 1.5
ryR Interest rate smoothing parameter of the Taylor rule 0.7
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3 .A .3 F igures
House Prices (LHS. annual growth rates) 12 Month Interbank Rate (RHS)
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Figure 3.1: Nominal house prices and interest rates.
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House Prices (LHS, annual growth) Mortgage Credit (RHS, annual growth rates)
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Figure 3.2: Nominal house prices and mortgage credit
Mortgages (LHS, annual growth rate) Current Account (RHS, as percent of GDP)
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Figure 3.3: Mortgage credit and the current account.
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Residential Investment (as percent of GDP) 12 Month interbank Rates
Figure 3.4: Resident investment and interest rates
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Figure 3.5: Demographic patterns
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Impulse Response functions to a One S.D. In terestR ate  shock 
(90% Confidence Intervals)
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Figure 3.6: Impulse Response from VAR.
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Impulse Response functions to a One S.D. Housing Demand shock 
(90% Confidence Intervals)
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Figure 3.7: Impulse Response from VAR.
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Figure 3.8: Impulse response to monetary policy shock. X axis: quarters after shock. 
Y axis: percent deviation from steady-state values.
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Figure 3.9: Impulse response to a risk premium shock. X axis: quarters after shock. 
Y axis: percent deviation from steady-state values.
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Figure 3.10: Impulse response to a housing preference shock. X axis: quarters after 
shock. Y axis: percent deviation from steady-state values.
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Figure 3.11: Impulse response to a risk premium shock. The effects of belonging to 
the EMU. X axis: quarters after shock. Y axis: percent deviation from steady-state 
values.
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Figure 3.12: Impulse response to a housing demand shock. The effects of belonging 
to the EMU. X axis: quarters after shock. Y axis: percent deviation from steady- 
state values.
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Figure 3.13: Impact response of a monetary policy shock. The role of financial 
frictions.
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Figure 3.14: Impact response of a housing preference shock. The role of financial 
frictions.
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Figure 3.15: Impact response of a monetary policy shock. The role of financial and 
labor market frictions.
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Figure 3.16: Impact response of a housing demand shock. The role of financial and 
labor market frictions.
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Figure 3.17: Impact response of a monetary policy shock. The role of nominal 
rigidities.
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Figure 3.18: Impact response of a housing preference shock. The role of nominal 
rigidities.
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